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FOR WHOM THE SCHOOL BELL TOLLS BUT NOT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: MINORS AND




This Article explores whether claims under the federal special education statute
should be tolled on account of minority. Adult disabled students typically assert
this type of tolling claim when alleging statutory violations dating back ten or
more years, when they were minors. However this tolling claim is decided, there
may be undesired results. First, even if the student has a very strong case, the mer-
its are never reached if the court dismisses the hearing request as untimely. Second,
if the hearing request is timely and the case proceeds to the merits, the student must
remain in her current educational placement, potentially at great cost, during the
lengthy IDEA hearing and appeals process as mandated by the IDEA's "stay put"
provision. Moreover, the school may face difficulties defending the claim on the
merits because under the IDEA, schools must allow parents and adult students to
request destruction of their special education records to the extent the records are
not currently required in order to provide services. Finally, unique challenges arise
for schools because parents help develop their child's special education program.
Accordingly, schools rely on both the parents' approval of the educational program,
as well as the parents' choice not to request a due process hearing for their minor
child. The IDEA specifically assigns the right to make this decision to the parents
of minor students, and not the minor students themselves, as part of the IDEA's
panoply of procedural safeguards.
Congress first addressed statute of limitations issues under the IDEA in the 2004
amendments. This Article surveys the relevant case law on whether to "borrow"
tolling provisions from state statutes and reveals great variation among the courts.
Specifically, the courts vary in their adherence to Supreme Court precedent, their ap-
plication of this precedent, and their conclusions about whether tolling on account of
minority should apply in IDEA disputes. The Article concludes that, because of the
unique role the IDEA assigns to parents, the correct approach under the pre-2004
amendments is not to toll claims for minors. The Article then examines the new
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IDEA language, which creates explicit statutes of limitation, but does not explicitly
address the issue of tolling for minor students. Consequently, in future litigation,
students and parents are likely to claim that tollingfor minors should be judicially
read into the IDEA's new statutes of limitations. However, this Article concludes,
through an application of the Supreme Court's guidance in this area, that a toll-
ing rule for legal minors should not be read into the IDEA's new statutes of
limitation. Tolling for minors is inconsistent with congressional intent as evi-
denced by the pre-2004 amendments analysis, and further strengthened by the new




Nearing the end of her eligibility under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)-the federal special education
statute-an adult, eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-old student with dis-
abilities requests an administrative "due process" hearing. The
hearing request claims that the student did not receive the free
appropriate educational program (FAPE) required by the IDEA.
The hearing request seeks compensatory educational services as
a remedy. The claimed IDEA violations date back more than ten
years, when the student was in elementary and middle school. The
student's parents participated on the team that developed the stu-
dent's educational program. The parents never objected to the
program as inappropriate, nor did the parents file for a due proc-
ess hearing while the student was a minor.
The school argues that this student's hearing request should be
dismissed as untimely. The student counters that the IDEA statute
of limitations was tolled while the student was a minor, and thus
her hearing request is indeed timely.
B. Potentially Harsh Results of Tolling
However the tolling issue is decided, there may be harsh results.
If the hearing request is dismissed as untimely, the merits of the
claim are never reached. This is so even if the student has a very
strong case and lacks culpability. Consequently, this student never
receives the compensatory education services to which she may
[VOL. 38:4
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have been entitled. If the school indeed denied the student FAPE,
she will presumably exit the special education system with lesser
skills and training than she deserves.
If, on the other hand, the hearing request is found to be timely
and the case proceeds to the merits, the IDEA's "stay put" provision
is triggered. This means that the student may remain in her cur-
rent educational placement while the IDEA hearing request and
any appeals are pending. The IDEA hearing process alone may
span many months; if appeals are involved, it may take years. Dur-
ing this time the school is obligated to continue providing special
education services to the student, perhaps even after her statutory
eligibility ends at age twenty-one In such litigation the odds are at
least equal that the school did not deny the student FAPE.' Further
lessening the odds for relief, some courts limit compensatory edu-
cation to gross violations of FAPE.3 If the hearing officer or court
ultimately determines there was no violation of the IDEA, the
school has no realistic possibility of reimbursement by the student
for these potentially costly services.
Moreover, defending the claim on the merits will be difficult for
the school-not only in the ways that defending stale claims are
generally difficult, but also because the IDEA requires schools to
offer parents and adult students an opportunity to request destruc-
tion of their special education records to the extent the records are
no longer currently required to provide services.4 Finally, the
school had relied on the parents in two additional ways: 1) their
apparent agreement with the educational program provided to the
student, and 2) their choice not to request a due process hearing
while the student was a minor, a right which the IDEA specifically
assigns to parents of minor students-and not the minor students
themselves-as part of the IDEA's panoply of procedural safe-
guards.
Until the 2004 amendments, effective July 1, 2005,' Congress
had not addressed statute of limitations issues under the IDEA.
The Supreme Court also has not had occasion to address tolling or
other IDEA statute of limitations issues. However, the Court has set
1. See generally Perry Zirkel, Compensatory Education Services Under the IDEA: An Anno-
tated Update, 190 EDUc. L. REP. 745, 746-47, 750-51 nn.30-31 (2004) (examining conflicting
case law on this issue).
2. See generally Perry Zirkel & Anastasia D'Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Em-
pirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731,736-37, 752 (2002).
3. Zirkel, supra note 1, at 746, 751 nn.32-35.
4. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.c.
5. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, § 302, 118 Stat. 2647, 2803.
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out an analytic process for addressing these issues when they arise
in a context similar to that of the IDEA.5 Specifically, when federal
statutes such as the pre-2004 IDEA do not contain a statute of limi-
tations, courts should try to identify and "borrow" an existing
statute of limitations, perhaps but not necessarily including tolling
provisions, which is consistent with the policy underlying the fed-
eral statute for which the time limit is being adopted, and thus
consonant with congressional intent. Courts faced with these issues
in IDEA tolling cases have differed in their adherence to actually
performing this borrowing analysis as well as in their application of
this analysis. Those courts disagree about whether tolling provi-
sions for minors in state statutes of limitations should be borrowed
in IDEA disputes.7
In the 2004 amendments, Congress added explicit statutes of
limitation to the IDEA. Requests for due process hearings (re-
ferred to as "Stage I" in this Article) must be filed by parents or
schools within two years.' Appeals of hearing decisions to court (re-
ferred to as "Stage II" in this Article) must be filed by parents or
schools within ninety days.9 The statutes of limitation added by the
2004 amendments include some exceptions, but do not explicitly
address the issue of tolling for minor students. Consequently, con-
tinued litigation of this issue is likely, with students and parents
claiming that tolling for minors should be judicially read into the
IDEA's new statutes of limitations. To determine the tolling issue in
this new post-2004 amendments context, courts will no longer look
to "borrow" from analogous provisions. However, somewhat like
the prior borrowing analysis, courts must ascertain "whether con-
gressional purpose is effectuated by [udicially implied] tolling [of]
the statute of limitations in given circumstances."'0 The indices of
Congressional intent for this purpose are "the purposes and poli-
cies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the
remedial scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights
given by the Act.""
6. The Court has also recognized more generally that statutes of limitation are "nec-
essarily arbitrary," since what the different statute of limitations approaches have in
common, as this opening scenario illustrates, is that each involves unavoidably harsh results.
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.a-b.
8. See infra text accompanying note 280.
9. See infra text accompanying note 282.
10. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965); see also infra text accompany-
ing note 289.
11. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 427.
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C. Scope of this Article
This Article examines whether minors can toll the statute of
limitations for filing at the due process and judicial review stages
under the IDEA. It does so for both the pre-2004 IDEA, which con-
tained no express statutes of limitations, and the post-2004 IDEA,
the amendments to which added statutes of limitation but did not
expressly address the issue of tolling for minors.2 The scope of this
Article does not extend to other statute of limitations exceptions,
such as: the continuing violation doctrine;' 3 to tolling under other
circumstances, such as disability, 4 incarceration, or absence from
the country; and tolling under other statutes sometimes utilized by
disabled students and their parents, such as Section 504"s and
other civil rights acts.' 6
12. Thus, this Article does not address equitable tolling based on distinguishable
grounds. See, e.g., Livingston Sch. Dist. Nos. 4 & I v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1996);
Asbury v. Mo. Dep't of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 29 IDELR (LRP Publications) 877
(E.D. Mo. 1999), aff'd, 9 E App'x 558 (8th Cir. 2001) (attempted exhaustion); Andalusia
City Bd. of Educ. v. Andress, 916 F. Supp. 1179 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (adequate representation by
attorney). Similarly, it does not address the related issue of notice of the statute of limita-
tions. Compare R.R. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 338 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling express
notice not required by an educational agency, at least under some circumstances), and Dell
v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994) (express notice not required), with M.D. v.
Southington Bd. of Educ., 16 F. App'x. 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (notice required), C.M. v. Bd. of
Educ., 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2001) (notice required), and Powers v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 61
F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling express notice by an educational agency required), and
M.M. v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 19 IDELR (LRP Publications) 967 (3d Cir. 1993) (ruling
express notice by an educational agency required).
13. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Wis.
2003); Hammond v. District of Columbia, No. CivA. 99-1723(GK), 2001 WL 34360429
(D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2001); Butler v. S. Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D.N.Y.
2000);JefferyY. v. St. Marys Area Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
14. Since disability is a requirement for eligibility under the IDEA, the consequences
of tolling for disability are similar to those for minors. While a detailed discussion of this
topic is beyond the scope of this article, much of the information and argument regarding
age tolling are applicable to disability tolling. See Wayne County Reg'l Educ. Serv. Agency v.
Pappas, 56 F. Supp. 2d 807, 817 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (permitting disability-based IDEA tolling
for a single severely disabled student while rejecting it for disability generally); see also infra
note 31 and accompanying text.
15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); see, e.g., M.D. v. Southing-
ton Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2003); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Isle of Wight County Sch. Bd., 284 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Va. 2003);
Schnuerle v. Unified Sch. Dist. 211, No. 01-1073-KMH, 2001 WL 1325952 (D. Kan. Sept. 27,
2001); Dupre v. Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux, No. Civ.A. 97-
3716, 1999 WL 694081 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1999); McKay v. Winthrop Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 96-
131-B, 1997 WL 816505 (D. Me.June 6,1997).
16. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is one example. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (2000); see, e.g., Patricia N. v. LeMahieu, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Haw. 2001); McKay,
1997 WL 816505, at *1. Section 1983 is another example. See, e.g.,James v. Upper Arlington
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Part II of this Article briefly reviews statutes of limitation gener-
ally and various related tolling issues. Part III of this Article offers a
cursory summary of the IDEA, along with a thorough review of the
unique role it assigns to parents. The IDEA parent role is a central
part of the IDEA policy and must be a primary consideration when
"borrowing" a statute of limitations tolling provision. Part IV of this
Article reviews the Supreme Court doctrine concerning "borrow-
ing" an analogous statute of limitations' tolling provision when
laws like the IDEA do not have their own explicit time limits. Part
IV then examines the body of case law addressing the issue of
whether state provisions establishing tolling for legal minors
should be borrowed for IDEA claims, concluding that the correct
approach under the pre-2004 amendments IDEA is not to toll
claims for minors. Part V of this Article sets out the new IDEA lan-
guage creating explicit Stage I and Stage II time limits and reviews
the Supreme Court's guidance on whether to read a tolling rule
for legal minors into a statute. Part V then applies this guidance to
the IDEA and concludes that a tolling rule for legal minors should
not be read into the IDEA's new statutes of limitation. Similar to
the pre-2004 amendments analysis, and strengthened by the new
amendments, tolling for minors is inconsistent with congressional
intent. Moreover, the consequences of tolling are harsher than
those of not tolling.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN GENERAL
A. Nature and Purposes of Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation are rules of law that set time limits for
bringing legal claims. For example, a state statute may specify a
three-year limit for filing a negligence claim. Statutes of limitation
serve several purposes: imposing finality on the litigation system,
giving potential defendants an end to their potential liability, and
avoiding litigation of disputes involving stale evidence.17 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, statutes of limitation also are "necessarily
City Sch. Dist., 228 E3d 764 (6th Cir. 2000); Richards v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 798 F.
Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993).
17. See Burnett v. N.Y Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (citation omitted) ("[Stat-
utes of limitation] promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and wit-
nesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put
the adversary on notice to defend .... ").
[VOL. 38:4
For Whom the School Bell Tolls
arbitrary"' 8 and produce harsh results. For example, a three-year
negligence statute of limitations means that a car accident plaintiff
can timely file her lawsuit two years, eleven months, and four weeks
after the car accident. If she files her lawsuit a few days later, how-
ever, it is subject to dismissal as time-barred. This is so even if her
claim is an extremely meritorious one. The Supreme Court has
held that statutes of limitations thus "reflect[] a value judgment
concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting
valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the
prosecution of stale ones. "'9
B. Statute of Limitations Dispute
Not surprisingly, given the high stakes set forth above, statutes of
limitation have been fodder for extensive litigation. One common
area of dispute is application of the appropriate statute of limita-
tion. For example, if a state has one statute of limitations for
negligence and another for assault and battery, an issue might arise
as to which applies to invasion of privacy claims. Another common
area of dispute is accrual: that is, when does the statute of limita-
tions clock begin to tick-the date of the injury, the date the
plaintiff discovers the injury, the date a reasonable person would
have discovered the injury, or the date when the plaintiff discovers
she has a cause of action? °
C. Tolling Issues
Tolling issues have also been frequently litigated. "Tolling" is the
suspension or interruption of the statute of limitations-in other
words, temporarily putting the statute of limitations clock on
hold.2' Tolling language is common in state statutes of limitation.
18. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
19. Id.
20. A separate statute of repose may impose an outer time limit on bringing claims re-
gardless of the accrual date for the statute of limitations. For example, a fifteen-year statute
of repose for product liability claims that runs from the date the product was introduced
into the market provides an outside limit on claims even where the statute of limitations has
not run.
21. See, e.g., William A. Harrington, Annotation, Imprisonment of Party to Civil Action as
Tolling Statute Limitations, 77 A.L.R.3d 735 (2003).
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Tolling typically applies where the injured party, who would be the
one to file a tort or other claim, is incapacitated from doing so, for
example because of infancy, insanity, and/or imprisonment.
22
Some statutes of limitation provide for tolling while the prospec-
tive plaintiff is a minor, because minors lack legal capacity to sue
on their own behalf and must rely on their parents to sue for them.
Examples of cases involving tolling for minors include negligence
suits where a minor suffers injuries in an automobile accident2 3 or
where a child is the victim of medical malpractice,4 as well as a li
bel case where the child is the allegedly defamed party and the
parents are dilatory in suing on the child's behalf.
2 5
Courts will also impose equitable tolling in appropriate and ex-
circumstances.26The Third Circuit noted that equitableceptional i n s  i r e t6qial
tolling prevents a party from profiting from its own wrongdoing
27
when the "plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented
from asserting his or her rights." 8 This can occur when a defen-
dant misleads the plaintiff about her claim,29  extraordinary
circumstances prevent the plaintiff from asserting her claim, the
plaintiff files a timely claim in the wrong forum,0 or where barring
the claim would be inconsistent with federal policy. For example,
conspiracy of a mentally incompetent person's guardian to deprive
her of her rights may form the basis for equitable tolling, but men-
tal incompetence does not automatically toll the statute of
22. See, e.g., Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Favor of
One Commencing Action Despite Existing Disability, 30 A.L.R.4th 1092 (2000). "Disability" is
defined generically in the article to include infancy, insanity, and imprisonment. See id. at
1093 n.1.
23. Id. at 1094 (citing Barnum v. Martin, 219 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (ruling
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff reached the age of major-
ity)).
24. Id. at 1095 (citing Smith v. Bordelove, 234 N.W.2d 535 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (rul-
ing that the child was entitled to sue because the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until she reached majority)); see also Fancsali ex tel. Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pitts-
burgh, 761 A.2d 1159 (Pa. 2000).
25. Maess, suora note 22, at 1093 (citing McLaughlin v. Beyer. 61 So. 62 (Ala. 1913)
(dismissing the parent's suit brought on behalf of the child but ruling that the child could
bring the case once she reached majority because the parent's mistake in not answering
interrogatories was not the child's mistake)).
26. See generally Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (stating that congressional in-
tent dictates the scope of federal equitable tolling).
27. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1388 (3d Cir. 1994).
28. Id. at 1387.
29. In specific cases where the defendant conceals a material fact from the plaintiff so
that the plaintiff does not realize she has a cause of action, this may be referred to as fraudu-
lent concealment of the claim, e.g., a surgeon who sees on a post-surgical x-ray that a clamp
was left in a patient but does not disclose this.
30. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387.
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limitations since normally a "guardian is expected to protect the
ward's interests. 1 According to one court, the aforementioned
conspiracy situation "differs from the more typical one where a
third party injures a mentally incompetent person and the guard-
ian fails to bring the claim in a timely fashion. In the latter case,
tolling would be inappropriate because the guardian had failed to
exercise due diligence."
3 2
D. Laches Defensefor Equitable Claims
Where the claim is for equitable relief, the defense of laches may
also be raised to assert an untimeliness bar. A successful laches de-
fense involves the defendant proving that the plaintiff
unreasonably delayed in bringing her claim for equitable relief,
causing prejudice to the defendant.33 Much relief sought under the
IDEA, such as a placement change, tuition reimbursement, or
compensatory education, is equitable in nature and thus might ar-
guably be subject to a laches defense.
III. THE IDEA
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) , the
federal special education statute, is unique in its structure and sub-
stance. It is particularly notable for the unique and central role it
creates for parents.
A. Overview of the IDEA
Congress structured the IDEA as a conditional funding statute.
The IDEA offers states modest 35 federal special education funds in
31. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a state statute of
limitations does not include tolling based on mental incompetency in a § 1983 claim based
on sterilization of a minor); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text regarding disabil-
ity-based tolling.
32. Lake, 232 F.3d at 371.
33. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
34. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1487 (2000).
35. The cost of educating students with disabilities is, on average, approximately twice
the cost of educating nondisabled students. See, e.g., Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To
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exchange for agreeing to comply with the IDEA's myriad of condi-
tions. Hence the IDEA is not a civil rights act with an unfunded
mandate, like Title VII,s6 which imposes a nondiscrimination man-
date on private and public actors without providing any funds to
meet that mandate. 7
The IDEA's conditional funding structure stands in contrast to
the two federal statutes that prohibit disability discrimination in
schools. 38 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504) is triggered
by the receipt of any federal education funds. 9 Schools covered by
§ 504 are obligated not to discriminate against students or employ-
ees based on disability. To meet this mandate, § 504 regulations
impose significant substantive affirmative obligations on schools,
but there are no funds earmarked to meet these obligations. Sec-
tion 504's sister statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) ,4 applies without regard to federal funding. The ADA pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of disability by private and public
employers, and places of public accommodation, specifically in-
cluding private and public schools. Section 504, the ADA, and the
IDEA all contain private causes of action, but with different reme-
dies. Section 504 and the ADA make damages available, while
IDEA remedies are normally equitable in nature (e.g., an order to
What Extent, If Any, May Cost Be a Factor in Special Education Cases., 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 11
(1992) (citing MARY MOORE ET AL., PATTERNS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION AND DELIVERY COSTS
(1988) (giving a specific ratio of 2.3)); What Are We Spending on Special Education Services in the
United States, 1999-2000?, SPECIAL EDUC. EXPENDITURE PROJECT, (Am. Inst. for Research,
Wash., D.C.), June 2004, at 17, available at http://csef-air.org/publications/seep/
national/AdvRptl.PDF (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(giving a ratio of 1.90). Yet, the federal government funds approximately only one-tenth of
the excess costs. See, e.g., id. at 18. The recent passage of the No Child Left Behind Act will
increase the gap. See, e.g., Joetta L. Sacks, No Child Law Views for Scarce State Resources, EDUC.
WEEK, Jan. 8, 2003, at 16. Compounding the resource allocation problem, the primary dis-
pute resolution mechanism of the Act has been not only cumbersome but also costly. See,
e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Transaction Costs and the IDEA, EDUC. WEEK, May 21, 2003, at 44.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (prohibiting race, national origin, gender, and religious
discrimination by public and private emplovers).
37. See generally Lynn M. Daggett, Special Education Attorney's Fees: Of Buckhannon, the
IDEA Reauthorization Bills, and the IDEA as Civil Rights Statute, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y
1, 3-7 (2004) (comparing the IDEA with traditional civil rights statutes and spending clause
legislation regulating education, and concluding that the IDEA is an uneasy hybrid of these
two kinds of statutes).
38. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178
EDUC. L. REP. 629, 630 (2003).
39. See generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (2004).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). For example, § 504 regulations require schools to provide
reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, 34 C.ER. § 104.12 (2004), and a free
appropriate public education to disabled K-12 public school students, id. at § 104.33.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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change the child's educational program, or to provide tuition re-
imbursement or compensatory education).
Substantively, the IDEA is also in marked contrast to § 504 and
the ADA. The IDEA and its regulations are, to cite one IDEA hear-
ing officer, "not only vast, but also detailed."42 Moreover, the IDEA
is couched in the language of specific positive educational rights,
rather than that of nondiscrimination. Perhaps in part for this rea-
son, the IDEA is sometimes referred to as "the last federal
entitlement."43 The primary substantive right the IDEA grants to
eligible students is a FAPE tailored to their unique needs. 4 The
IDEA also requires that eligible students receive their educations in
the "least restrictive environment" (LRE) that is appropriate for
them. To implement FAPE and LRE, teams create an "individual-
ized education program" (IEP) for each IDEA student.
B. The Role of Parents Under the IDEA
1. Nature and Purposes of the IDEA Parent Role-The IDEA also is
distinctive in terms of providing parents with a special role that
pervades the central processes of the Act, including the identifica-
tion, evaluation, and placement of their child.45  Where
disagreements arise, the IDEA also provides parents with a key role
in the primary dispute resolution mechanism of the Act.46 More
specifically, they-along with the school district-have the exclu-
sive rights to file for an impartial due process hearing 7 and,
typically after exhausting this administrative mechanism, to bring a
civil action where attorneys' fees may be provided.48
42. New Lothrop Area Pub. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR (LRP Publications) 174 (SEA Mich.
2004). In contrast, § 504's text and its regulations for public elementary and secondary
schools are quite brief. The ADA and its regulations are more lengthy, but do not contain
education-specific provisions.
43. See, e.g., Margaret Tebo, Seeking the Right Equation: Educators and Parents Seek Legal
Answers on How to Balance Students' Special Needs with Broader School Goals, A-B.A. J., Sept. 2002,
at 50 (quoting Bruce Boyer of Loyola University Law School in Chicago).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.13 (2004).
45. See infra Part III.B.2.
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (2004). The alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanism is the complaint resolution process that each state must provide under
the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2004).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (a) (2004).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)-(3) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.512(a), .513(a) (2004). The
parents's role can be inferred by the generic reference to "party." See, e.g., Va. Office of Prot.
& Advocacy v. Va. Dep't of Educ., 262 E Supp. 2d 648, 659 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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In its IDEA findings, Congress clearly stated that these parent
rights exist for utilitarian reasons, specifically, to enhance the effec-
tiveness of their children's educational programs, rather than as a
substantive right of parenting or a special form of parents' rights to
raise their children as they see fit.49 These findings specify in perti-
nent part:
(5) Over 20 years of research and experience has demon-
strated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by-
... (B) strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at
home ....
As these findings make clear, Congress's purpose in creating the
IDEA parent role and rights was utilitarian. The IDEA parent role
is specifically designed to ensure the effectiveness of each IDEA
student's education program. Congress believed that parent in-
volvement and support was essential to the success of the student's
education program. Additionally, in prior litigation that in large
part inspired the original enactment of the statute, 51 Congress rec-
ognized both the unsatisfactory treatment of disabled students by
some school systems as well as the effectiveness of parents as educa-
tional advocates for their children.52 The parent role Congress
established in the IDEA thus acted as the check on schools that
Congress thought was needed in light of the schools' past history
with disabled students while serving as a workable way to enforce
the IDEA.
The IDEA gives parents of disabled children a central role
throughout the evaluation, identification, and placement of their
child that extends well beyond the role of parents whose children
49. See generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding a constitutional
right of parenting, which includes the right to choose private schooling).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5) (B) (2000).
51. See generally Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 E Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 E Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
52. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of parental participation un-
der the IDEA, holding that Congress felt a need to emphasize the "necessity of parental
participation" when enacting the IDEA, in part because in the past, parents were not con-
sulted concerning their child's education. See generally Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309-12
(1988) (discussing the IDEA under its former name, the Education of the Handicapped
Act).
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are in general education. Simply put, parents are both proxies and
partners. IDEA parents act as proxies, or representatives, in assert-
ing the substantive rights and interests that the IDEA provides to
their children. Parents are also full partners in making the deci-
sions about their child's special education eligibility and program.
According to the Department of Education, the agency that en-
forces the IDEA, parents are "expected to be equal participants
along with school personnel, in developing, reviewing, and revising
the IEP for their child.
5 3
2. IDEA Provisions Concerning Parents
a. Parent Involvement in IDEA Eligibility Determinations-More spe-
cifically, the IDEA involves parents in the threshold determinations
concerning whether a child may be eligible for special education.
Specifically, parents must give informed consent before the school
district may conduct an initial evaluation of a child.5 Moreover,
parents are required members of the group that reviews all evalua-
tion data and ascertains the need for any additional data to
determine the child's eligibility. 6 The parent also has a right to ob-
tain an independent educational evaluation for their child 57 that
the district must in some circumstances pay for and, in any event,
consider.8 Once all evaluations are complete, the parents, in part-
nership with the group of qualified professionals, are responsible
for determining whether the child has a disability.
59
b. Parent Involvement in the Initial Placement in Special Education
Decisions--Once the child's IDEA eligibility is established,6e the par-
ents' special central role continues. As a second and significant
threshold step, the parents must consent to the initial provision of
special education, including any necessary related services.61 The
2004 amendments make the parent consent role so strong and
53. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, No. 5 (2004).
54. These provisions include a corresponding role upon the required reevaluation of
the child. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)-(2), 1415(a)-(c) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504(a) (1)-(3),
.505(a)-(c), .534-536 (2004).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1) (c) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a) (1) (2004). If a parent re-
fuses to consent, the educational agency may continue to pursue evaluations by filing for
due process. 34 C.ER. § 300.505(b) (2004).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a) (2004).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a) (1) (2004).
58. 34 C.ER. § 300.502(b)-(c) (2004).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (4) (A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(a)(1) (2004).
60. Conversely, if the team determines that the child is not eligible, the parents may
exercise their disagreement by challenging the determination under the Act's dispute reso-
lution provisions. See infra Part III.B.2.i.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(f) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a)(1)(ii) (2004); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a) (1) (C) (i) (2000).
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central that due process hearing officers are now forbidden from
overriding the parents if they refuse such initial consent for ser-
62
vices.
c. Parent Access to Student Records-During the child's participa-
tion under the Act, the parents must have an opportunity to review
all education records concerning identification, evaluation, and
placement of the child as well as the provision of FAPE . Signifi-
candy, reinforcing and customizing the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA),64 the right to access the child's
records does not transfer from the parents to the child until the
child reaches eighteen or, under the special transfer provisions of
the IDEA, beyond that age.65
d. Parent Participation in IDEA Meetings-IDEA parents also have
the special right to participate in all meetings concerning identifi-
cation, evaluation, and placement of the child as well as the
provision of FAPE.66 Reinforcing this right, the district must also
62. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, §614(a)(I)(D)(ii)(11), 118 Stat. 2647, 2703 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II)). This was the view of the federal agency that administers the IDEA
prior to the 2004 amendments. See, e.g., OSEP Letter to Yudien (Mar. 20, 2003), 38 IDELR
(LRP Publications) 267 (2003); OSERS Letter to Gagliardi (Nov. 5, 2001), 36 IDELR (LRP
Publications) 267 (2001); OSEP Letter to Cox (Sept. 24, 2001), 36 IDELR (LRP Publica-
tions) 66 (2001). One federal district court held to the contrary. Garcia v. Town of
Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., EHLR (LRP Publications) 558:152 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that
the IDEA obligations run directly from the school to the parent, and thus under some cir-
cumstances, if a school believes a student requires special education, and a parent refuses
the necessary written consent, the school must initiate due process to attempt to override the
parent's refusal). This ruling fits with the administering agency's interpretation prior to the
1997 amendments. See OSEP Letter to Williams (Sept. 20, 1991), 18 IDELR (LRP Publica-
tions) 534 (1991).
IDEA regulations provide that parents may revoke consent, but any such revocation is not
retroactive. 34 C.F.R. § 300.500(b) (1) (iii) (A)-(B) (2004).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.501 (a)(l) (2004).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (2004).
65. 34 C.F.R. § 300.574(b) (2004).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.501(a)(2) (2004). "Meetings" do
not include informal or unscheduled conversations on teaching methodology, lesson plans,
or coordination of services if those issues are not addressed in the IEP; it also does not in-
clude preparatory activities that an agency engages in when responding to a parental
proposal. 34 C.F.R. § 300.501(b)(2) (2004). Further, some courts have held that the par-
ents's participation is so essential to IDEA that the district's failure to facilitate that
participation can lead to a denial of FAPE. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch.
Dist., 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003); AmandaJ. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877 (9th
Cir. 2001);Jaynes v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 13 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2001); Amanda S. v.
Webster City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR (LRP Publications) 698 (N.D. Iowa 1998). But see
Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Zelazny, 325 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2003); N.L. v. Knox
County Pub. Sch., 315 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2003). The 2004 amendments make explicit that an
IDEA hearing officer may not find a denial of FAPE from "procedural inadequacies" gener-
ally, but only if the procedural inadequacies "significantly impeded the parents' opportunity
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provide the parents with prior notice of any such meeting67 and
make reasonable efforts to ensure the parents' meaningful partici-
pation, including arrangements for an interpreter if the parents
are deaf or non-English speakers."
e. Parent Involvement in Discipline Decisions-Similarly, the special
discipline provisions of the IDEA provide parents with special
partnership-type rights.69 For example, parents are required mem-
bers of the team that determines whether the behavior subject to
discipline was caused by the child's disability70 and, if they disagree
with the team's determination, they have the right to challenge it
under the Act's impartial dispute-resolution mechanism.7
f Parent Role on IDEA 1EP Teams--As discussed in Section III.A
supra, the cornerstone of the Act is the IEP, or Individualized Edu-
cation Program, that is developed to provide each child with
FAPE.72 The IEP development team must include the child's par-
ents.73 Additionally, the IDEA provides parents with the right to
bring other individuals who have knowledge or expertise regarding
the child to the team's meetings.74 Reinforcing the importance of
the parents' participation, the school district must take special
steps such as notifying parents of the meeting time and whom the
school has invited, and scheduling the meeting at a mutually
agreed-upon time and place.75 Once the team completes the IEP,
the district must provide the parents with a copy of it at no cost to
them.76
to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of [FAPE] to the par-
ents' child." 20 U.S.CA. § 1415(f) (3) (E) (ii) (West Supp. 2005).
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (3) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.501 (b)(1) (2004).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (4) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.501 (c) (5) (2004).
69. Specifically, these provisions apply to suspensions, expulsions, or other removals
that constitute a change in placement. 20 US.C. § 1415(k) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519
(2004). Moreover, they apply even to children not yet determined eligible under the Act in
specified situations, including where the parents have formally expressed concern about the
child's possible eligibility or where the parents have requested an evaluation under the Act.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.527(b) (2004).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (4) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(b) (2004).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (6) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.525 (2004). Interestingly, the rele-
vant regulation is tifled "Parent appeal," not child's appeal. 34 C.F.R. § 300.525 (2004).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10) (B) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.340(a) (2004).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.344(a) (1) (2004). The child can
also be a member of the team if it is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2000); 34
C.ER. § 300.344(a) (7) (2004).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (B) (2000); 34 C.ER. § 300.344(a) (6) (2004).
75. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a) (2004).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (B) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(f) (2004).
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g. IDEA Services for Parents-The IDEA even provides that one of
the "related services" the IEP may include is "parent counseling
and training."" This term is defined as "[a]ssisting parents in un-
derstanding the special needs of their child" and "[p]roviding
parents with information about child development.""'
The related services and remedies under the Act further extend
to parents. In several opinion letters, the Department of Educa-
tion, the agency that enforces the IDEA, has stated that sign
language training for the parents of a hearing-impaired child is an
appropriate related service, subject of course to the recommenda-
tion of the IEP team.7 9 Similarly, one court required that parents be
trained to implement behavioral management techniques at
home."° That case involved a student with an emotional disability
who engaged in a number of disruptive and dangerous behaviors
at home and at school.8' The court ordered the school to pay for
counseling for the parents to help them to manage their son's be-
havior at home by "complement [ing] at home the [behavioral]
training [he] receives at school." 2
h. Parent Notice Requirements-Additionally, the IDEA expressly
provides that parents are entitled to advance written notice a "rea-
sonable" time before any change or refusal to change their child's
identification, evaluation, placement, or FAPE.s3 Parents may re-
quest an IEP team meeting about their child at any time, and
schools "should grant any reasonable parent request for an IEP
meeting. ,84
i. Parents and IDEA Disputes-Particularly pertinent is the role
the IDEA assigns to parents if a dispute arises regarding the child's
77. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16 (b)(7) (2004).
78. Id. Section 1431 (e) of the IDEA establishes grants for providing training and in-
formation to parents.
79. OSEP Letter to Anonymous (Dec. 8, 1992), 19 IDELR (LRP Publications) 586
(1992); OSEP Letter to Dagley (June 3, 1991), 17 EHLR (LRP Publications) 1107 (1991);
OSEP Letter to Dole (July 25, 1986), EHLR (LRP Publications) 211:399 (1986). In its earli-
est letter, the Department suggested the following requirement for services to parents: "Any
related services provided for parents must assist the child in developing skills needed to
benefit from special education or correct conditions which interfere with the child's pro-
gress toward the goals and objectives listed in the IEP." Id. (noting that parent services may
be provided prior to beginning, or concurrently with, special education instruction).
80. Chris D. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 753 F Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1990)
(affirming the hearing officer's decision and recommendations of an independent evaluator
in this respect).
81. Id. at 923.
82. Id. at 933.
83. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504-.505 (2004).
84. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, No. 20 (2004).
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identification, evaluation, placement, or FAPE. First, to inform
parents about their role in the IDEA dispute resolution process,
the Act requires the school to provide parents with written notice
of the parents' procedural safeguards, including their right to file
for a hearing.s Only the parents (or, on the other side, the school)
may initiate an impartial "due process hearing" to resolve the mat-
ter.s6 At that hearing, the parents have the right to have the child
present, have the hearing open to the public, and receive a record,
findings of fact, and decision of the hearing. 7 The 2004 IDEA
amendments go even further by explicitly providing that the hear-
ing officer may not find a denial of FAPE from procedural
inadequacies generally, but may find a denial of FAPE if the proce-
dural inadequacies "significantly impeded the parents' opportunity
to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provi-
sion of a [FAPE] to the parents' child."
88
The IDEA provides parents (as well as the opposing party at the
hearing) with the ability to file for judicial review of the hearing
officer's decision. 9 While the hearing and any appeals are pending,
the IDEA's "stay put" provision requires in most circumstances that
the student remain in her last educational placement. However,
the IDEA explicitly assigns to parents the right to waive "stay put"
and agree to an alternate interim placement for their child.90 Fi-
nally, to encourage parents to initiate this dispute resolution
process if they believe the school is violating the IDEA, the IDEA
provides for reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees to par-
ents who prevail in IDEA proceedings. 9
85. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (2004).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1) (2004). In contrast, con-
sider the very different statutory approach for workers' compensation claims. Under several
state workers' compensation statutes, the statute of limitations in workers' compensation
claims does not begin to run on a minor unless a guardian is appointed. See, e.g., Massey v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 854 P.2d 117 (Cal. 1993); Benton v. ICR Elec., 852 So.2d 295
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Mem'l Hosp. v. Szuba, 705 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); East v.
W.C.A.B., 786 A.2d 1044 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). Parents are not automatically "guardians"
for this purpose. See, e.g., Meml Hosp., 705 N.E.2d at 523; WC.A.B., 786 A.2d 1044 (holding
that a minor child's case based on a deceased parent's right to workers' compensation does
not begin to run until the child reaches majority). Therefore, and in marked contrast to the
IDEA, parents do not have any role as to their children's on-the-job injuries under some
workers' compensation statutes.
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.509(c) (2004).
88. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, §615(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(0 (3) (E) (ii) (II)).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a) (2004).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), (k)(7) (2000).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (2000).
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j. Parents of Adult IDEA Students-Of additional, special signifi-
cance, the IDEA not only specifies that each of these rights belongs
to the parents,92 including that of filing for a hearing and judicial
appeal, but also provides that these rights do not automatically
transfer to the child upon reaching the age of majority. More spe-
cifically, the IDEA authorizes states to transfer from the parent to
the child the related records93 and other rights formerly belonging
to the parent when the child reaches majority.94 However, the am-
biguous statutory language suggests that the student only obtains
these rights if the state enacted transfer legislation.9'
Moreover, even where the state enacts such transfer legislation,
the IDEA does not extinguish the parents' role. Instead, the IDEA
requires the district to notify them of any meetings or evaluations
until the child is no longer IDEA-eligible due to having graduated
or having reached the statutory ceiling of twenty-one. 96 Further,
where the state provides transfer rights, the IDEA makes an excep-
tion for those students deemed incompetent or incapable of
providing informed consent.97 In any event, to whatever extent the
IDEA permits or prohibits the transfer of rights at age eighteen,
obviously these special rights and corollary responsibilities belong
to the parents during the child's minority. This time constitutes
most, if not all of the typical period for the "hearing officer" and
"judicial review" steps under the Act.
k. DEA Provisions for Appointing Surrogate Parents-To ensure
that each IDEA student has a person who can exercise this parental
role, the IDEA contains special provisions for appointing surrogate
parents where the parents are unknown or unavailable, or where
the IDEA student is a ward of the state.98 To facilitate their role in
representing the child at various steps, including Stages I and II of
the dispute resolution process, the 2004 amendments provide
92. The role is so central that the IDEA defines the term broadly and has special provi-
sions for appointing surrogate parents where necessary. 20 U.S.C. §§1401(19)(B),
1415(b) (2) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.20(a) (4), .515 (2004).
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (4), (k)(6) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.523(b), .525 (2004).
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (2004). These provisions effec-
tively reverse the usually rebuttable presumption that children assume their own rights and
responsibilities upon reaching the age of majority.
95. See, e.g., Deborah Rebore & Perry Zirkel, Transfer of Rights Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Act: Adulthood With Ability orDisability, 2000 BYU EDUc. & L.J. 33, 34.
96. Id. at 38.
97. Id. at 38-39.
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19)(B), 1415(b)(2) (2000); 34 C.ER. §§ 300.20(a)(4), .515
(2004).
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additional provisions for surrogate parents while broadening the
definition of parents.99
1. Parent Provisions in the 2004 IDEA Amendments-The 2004
IDEA amendments further strengthen the role of parents in the
IDEA, even to the point where schools must defer to certain (pos-
sibly wrong) parent choices about their child's special education.
Enacting guidance from the Department of Education,' °° and over-
riding at least one court decision,"' the 2004 amendments provide
that if a parent refuses to give the necessary consent for initial
placement in special education, the school may not initiate due
process to attempt to override the lack of parental consent and get
a hearing officer to order placement in special education.0 2 While
reasonable people may disagree about the wisdom of this ap-
proach, Congress has made it clear that a parent's wish to keep
her child in general education overrides a school's reasonable be-
lief that the student needs special education, and thereby the
child's receipt of an appropriate education. This new provision and
others'04 also make it clear that Congress recognized that on occa-
sion an eligible student would not receive FAPE as the result of a
parent choice.
3. Court and Hearing Officer Interpretations of the IDEA Parent
Role-In its first IDEA case, the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the importance of the parental role. In that case, the
99. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, §§ 602(23), 615(b) (2), 118 Stat. 2647, 2657, 2716.
100. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101. See Garcia v. Town of Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., EHLR (LRP Publications) 558:152
(D. Conn. 1986) (explaining that IDEA obligations run directly from the school to the par-
ent, and thus, under some circumstances, if a school believes that a student requires special
education, and a parent refuses the necessary written consent, the school must initiate due
process to attempt to override the parent's refusal); cf OSEP Letter to Williams (Sept. 20,
1991), 18 IDELR (LRP Publications) 534 (1991).
102. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, § 614(1) (D) (ii), 118 Stat. 2647, 2703 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (1) (D) (ii)).
103. The authors themselves do not all agree with this policy solution. For example,
Daggett encountered several situations in practice where a parent of an obviously emotion-
ally disturbed child refused to consent to initial placement in special education. Without
special education, many emotionally disturbed students are not able to benefit academically,
and some are disruptive and even dangerous to themselves and others. In some of these
cases, the parents seem to have their own problems, such as denial of their child's disability,
or emotional problems themselves. In these situations, Daggett found that the school's
threat to file for due process went a long way toward resolving the dispute about special
education placement.
104. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, § 612(a) (25), 118 Stat. 2647, 2691 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (25))
(prohibiting schools from conditioning school attendance, evaluation, or provision of ser-
vices on a student getting, and presumably taking, certain prescription medications).
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Court established a two-part standard for judicial review of special
education disputes. '°5 First, the reviewing court must determine if
"the individualized educational program developed through the
Act's procedures [is] reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits?' ' 1 6 Second, the court must determine
if the school complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements."7
The Court characterized the IDEA's procedural safeguards as
"Congress' effort to maximize parental involvement in the educa-
tion of each handicapped child.",0 8 These procedural safeguards
and parent participation specifically were deemed of crucial im-
portance, leading the Court to state that: "It seems to us no
exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much empha-
sis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians
a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative
process, as it did upon the.., substantive standard."'0 9
The Court went on to assert that parents "will not lack ardor" in
seeing that their children get all the benefits of the IDEA,"" thus
appearing to recognize that the IDEA's effectiveness depends on
parents' involvement in their children's special education, specifi-
cally including the exercise of the procedural safeguards assigned
to them on behalf of their children.
Since then, courts and hearing officers have routinely recog-
nized the important and special role that parents play under the
IDEA."' First, many cases have recognized that parents are to have
a meaningful opportunity to participate in their child's education
under the IDEA. 12 This includes the right to participate in the de-
velopment of the IEP"13 as well as to participate in any IEP meetings
held for the child."14 One court held that an IEP is meant to be a
105. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
106. Id. at 207.
107. Id. at 206-07.
108. Id. at 182 n.6.
109. Id. at 205-06 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 209.
111. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
2003); AmandaJ. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001);Jaynes v. Newport
News Scb. Bd., 13 E App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2001); Amanda S. v. Webster City Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
27 IDELR (LRP Publications) 698 (N.D. Iowa 1998). But see Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Zelazny, 325 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2003); N.L. v. Knox County Sch., 315 F.3d 688 (6th
Cir. 2003).
112. See, e.g., Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2000); Bd. of Educ.
of the Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR (LRP Publications) 419 (SEA N.Y. 1997); Grape-
vine-Colleyville Indep. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR (LRP Publications) 574 (SEA Tex. 1996).
113. Bd. of Educ. of the Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR (LRP Publications) at 423.
114. Grapevine-Cofieyville Indep. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR (LRP Publications) at 575.
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'joint product of discussions among the child's parents, teachers,
and local school officials."1 5 This "meaningful participation" may
mean giving special accommodations to the parent, such as an in-
terpreter.116 Parents must be treated as equal partners in the IEP
development and meetings due to the legislative emphasis on a full
opportunity for parent participation." ' The reason for this empha-
sis on participation is the "unity of interest" between a parent and
their child in securing FAPE."
Case law and administrative decisions specifically support the
identified parent role as proxy and partner as a means to the ends
of educational effectiveness. For example, one federal appeals
court has held that parent hostility is a valid factor in determining
placement." 9 Although "continued and extreme," the appeals
court found that the parents' hostility to the proposed place-
ment-hostility that they had expressed to their child-would
prevent the student from receiving educational benefits in that
placement. The majority acknowledged that its decision might re-
ward parents for intransigence, but found that the relevant
consideration was not the impact on the parents, but the educa-
tional benefit to the child:
Under the [IDEA] ... our concern is not rewarding or pun-
ishing parents. The appropriate concern is finding a program
which will be of educational benefit to the child. Were we to
adopt the school district's position... this would in effect be
punishing children for the actions of their parents.... The
[IDEA] makes clear whose interest must be paramount.1
20
Occasionally, a court has suggested that IDEA rights belong to
the child and thus may not be waived by the parent. 2' According to
115. Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting Cavanagh
v. Grasmick, 75 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456-57 (D. Md. 1999)).
116. See supra text accompanying note 68.
117. Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR (LRP Publications) 248, 256 (SEA Iowa
1994).
118. Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 248 F. Supp. 2d 936 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Rd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 1991), noted in
Perry A. Zirkel, A Special Education Case of Parent Hostility, 73 EDUc. L. REP. 1 (1992).
120. Id. at 717. The majority also suggested that hearing officers could detect parent
opposition that was feigned in order to achieve the placement the parent preferred. Id. at
718.
121. See generally Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 119, 121 n.2 (4th Cir.
1989) (citing Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that disability
suits can be brought by both the child and her parents).
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this reasoning, failure of the parents of a child to initiate the IDEA
dispute resolution process should not act as a bar to the child
bringing the claim years later as a legal adult.
In fact, the IDEA and case law recognize that parents may, in at
least four scenarios, waive FAPE for their child; rejecting tolling for
minors thus would not result in a consequence not already specifi-
cally contemplated under the IDEA. First, as discussed earlier in
the Article, parents may refuse to consent to the initial placement
of their child in special education. 22 If the child needs special edu-
cation, this refusal obviously results in the child not receiving
FAPE. Second, parents may withdraw their disabled child from the
public schools and place her in a private school where special edu-
cation may or may not be provided12 because they believe that the
public school is not meeting its IDEA obligations (a unilateral
placement). In unilateral placement cases, parents may be entitled
to reimbursement of tuition and expenses, but only if the program
is appropriate and the school has not offered an appropriate pro-
gram.124 "Appropriate" is defined in part as meeting "the standards
of the State educational agency,"12 and thus schools may not place
students in private facilities unapproved for special education.
126
The Supreme Court has held, however, that parents may place
their child in a private program that is not approved by the state,
and may obtain public reimbursement if it is otherwise "appropri-
121ate" and the school has not offered an appropriate program.
Third, parents may enroll a disabled child in a private school when
FAPE is available through the public schools (perhaps, for exam-
ple, because the parent prefers a religious education for her
122. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.1.
123. Students placed in private schools by their parents are entitled to an equitable op-
portunity to participate in IDEA-funded services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (4) (A) (2000); 34
C.F.R. §§ 76.651-.662, 300.450-452 (2004). This does not mean that each such child is enti-
tled to FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(i) (2000).
124. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). This stan-
dard was codified and embellished in the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10) (2000).
Specifically, reimbursement may be denied if the court finds "unreasonableness with respect
to actions taken by the parents." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10) (C) (iii) (III) (2000).
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (8) (B) (2000).
126. See OSEP Letter to Green (Feb. 8, 1995), 22 IDELR (LRP Publications) 639, 641
(1995).
127. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12-16 (1993). The school was
not approved because not all of its teachers were certified, and it did not develop IEPS. Id. at
14. In addition, the Carters had had no notice of which private schools were approved for
special education. Id. The Court did not decide whether parents could be reimbursed for
placement in an unapproved school if they had prior notice of its status and a list of ap-
proved facilities. Finally, the Court limited this right to reasonable reimbursement
considering program costs. Id. at 16.
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child). In such cases, the child loses the legal right to FAPE. 25
Fourth, parents who initiate IDEA due process claims may settle
them in a way which results in less than full FAPE for their child.'2
In each of these four scenarios, Congress and the courts have con-
templated that parents may take actions that result in less than
FAPE for their child.
These scenarios illustrate that tolling for minors is not required
to avoid a result that is already part and parcel of the statutory
scheme. Moreover, for the Congressional choice of a unique IDEA
parent role to be workable and effective, a result of less than FAPE
for a given child must be accepted. For example, if parents could
not waive IDEA claims as part of a settlement, or if such a waiver
did not bind the child, schools would have no incentive to settle
claims.
Case law also interprets the IDEA parent role in the event of di-
vorce so as to ensure its workability and hence its effectiveness.
When there is a divorce and the divorced parents disagree about
their child's special education, they lose the ability to be effective
advocates for their child. While the IDEA does not expressly ad-
dress this issue, the prevailing judicial interpretation is that the
custodial parent has the right to file for a hearing under the
IDEA.'" In such cases, however, the IDEA parent role is important
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10) (2000).
129. See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497-99 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that parent
settlements waiving IDEA and related claims are not per se invalid, and adopting a civil
rights standard for review and approval of such settlements). The 2004 IDEA amendments
encourage settlements by establishing pre-hearing meetings and enabling state and federal
courts to enforce any settlements entered into at these meetings. Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 615(f)(1)(B), 118 Stat. 2647,
2720-21.
130. See, e.g., Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 E3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002); Navin v. Park
Ridge Sch. Dist, 270 E3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2001); Schares v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp.
2d 364 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Carpenter v. Pennell Sch. Dist. Elementary Unit, Nos. CIVA. 01-
6270 & CIV.A. 02-625, 2002 WL 1832854 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2002); Tustin Unified Sch. Dist.,
EHLR (LRP Publications) 507:120 (SEA Cal. 1985); Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR (LRP
Publications) 285 (SEA Pa. 2002); Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR (LRP Publications)
30 (SEA Pa. 2001); N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR (LRP Publications) 774 (SEA Pa.
1997); In re S.B., 28 IDELR (LRP Publications) 813 (SEA Vt. 1998); In re T.C., 25 IDELR
(LRP Publications) 1245, 1246-47 (SEA Vt. 1997) ("[It is [the custodial parent] who has
the sole right and responsibility to 'determine and control various matters affecting [the
child's] welfare and upbringing,' including, specifically, his 'education.'"); Randolph Sch.
Dist., EHLR (LRP Publications) 509:183 (SEA Vt. 1987). There is some authority to the
contrary. See, e.g., Fauconier v. Comm. on Special Educ., No. 02 CIV.1050 RCC RLE, 2002
WL 31235786 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2002), affd, 112 F. App'x 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
One court reasoned that if a parent is deprived of custody, then that parent also is de-
prived of decision-making power. Hazelton Aea Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR (LRP Publications) at
122. One federal court held that the definition of "parent" in the IDEA did not exclude the
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enough that the non-custodial parent retains other rights on a sec-
ondary basis unless the custody agreement or divorce decree
specifies the allocation of authority for such educational decisions.
Two such rights are the right to participate in IEP meetings and to
be present at due process hearings. As an example, the Seventh
Circuit held that a non-custodial parent retained the right to be
involved in their child's education but that the custodial parent's
decisions involving the child's education will prevail. '
Somewhat similarly, case law and administrative decisions inter-
pret the nature of the parents' right to file for a due process
hearing and their role in the IDEA dispute resolution process as a
proxy for their child. For example, one hearing officer held that "a
request for [a] due process [hearing] may be-and usually is-
filed by the parent ... on behalf of the student."'32 That hearing
officer reasoned that some students who have an IEP do not have
the level of knowledge necessary to understand IDEA procedural
safeguards. 33 Not all courts recognize this. One court interpreted
the right to file for due process hearings as belonging to the par-
ents even if they do not have actual custody of the child."M
Moreover, some courts have held that the parents' right to file for a
hearing continues even when the authorities appoint surrogate
parents.3 5 One court reasoned that parents, legal guardians, and
surrogates have the right to initiate due process hearings.'
3 6
Similarly, courts have held generally that parents have standing
to request due process hearings and file for judicial review under
the IDEA,' 37 but are split on whether standing is based solely on the
non-custodial parent. Fuentes v. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 CV 1454, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12378,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2002).
131. See Navin, 270 F.3d at 1149. That court further stated that it is "doubtful that a non-
custodial parent may use the next-friend device to seize control of the child's educational
decision making, when a divorce decree has given those choices to the custodial parent." Id.
at 1148-49.
132. Apache Junction Unified Sch. Dist., 39 IDELR (LRP Publications) 49 (SEA Ariz.
2003).
133. In light of this right and the related procedural safeguards granted to them, the
Second Circuit characterized the IDEA as a "bill of rights for parents." Vander Malle v. Am-
bach, 673 F.2d 49,52 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting Stemple v. Bd. of Educ., 623
F.2d 893, 898 (4th Cir. 1980)).
134. W.T. v. Andalusia City Sch., 977 E Supp. 1437, 1444 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
135. See, e.g., John H. v. MacDonald, EHLR (LRP Publications) 558:366 (D.N.H. 1987).
Unless the rights are transferred at the age of majority, parents, rather than the child, have
the right to file for a hearing. Id. at 558:370.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g.,Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1996); W.B. v.
Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Mylo v. Bd. of Educ., No. 91-2563, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
27029 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 1991); Vander Male, 673 F.2d 49; Matthew M. v. William Penn Sch.
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parent's "proxy for the child" role, or rather to assert her own
rights as a parent. A minority of the courts view the IDEA as provid-
ing for separable rights exclusive to parents. One federal court
reasoned that the purpose of the IDEA was to assure that the rights
both of children with disabilities and their parents are protected.'9
Another held that parents are within the "zone of interests" of the
IDEA.139 However, that court was faced with the special situation of
a tuition reimbursement, where a parent, acting on behalf of her
child, spent her own money to send the child to private school
when the public school allegedly was not providing their child with
FAPE, the parents did incur injury by spending their own funds to
remedy an IDEA violation. 4° Another court held that, because the
IDEA granted parents certain rights, the parents have the right to
sue to enforce those rights. 41 This minority view merely removes
the tolling question for the separable parental rights, leaving unaf-
fected the issue of whether tolling applies to the remaining child
rights where the parent serves as proxy. The majority view, and the
more well-reasoned approach, is that while parents have standing
to sue on behalf of their child, they do not have standing to sue in
their own right. 42 Hearing officers also have held that the parents'
standing to bring suit ceases when the child reaches majority, when
the right to file for a due process hearing may transfer to the stu-
dent, 43 thus recognizing that the rights belong to the student rather
than to the parent. 4 One hearing officer has held that the even
when the rights transfer to the adult student, in an appeal, it is at
times too difficult to divide the rights of the parent and the child. 45
Because their interests are aligned, the purpose of the IDEA is best
served when both the parents and the child are allowed to pursue
Dist., No. 01-7177, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10385 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2002); Bernard v. Sch.
Bd., 58 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Va. 1999);John H., EHLR (LRP Publications) 558:366; Apple-
ton Area Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR (LRP Publications) 87 (SEA Wis. 2001); Unified Sch. Dist. of
De Pere, 21 IDELR (LRP Publications) 1206 (SEA Wis. 1994).
138. Mylo, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27029, at *2.
139. Bernard, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
140. See id. The Supreme Court has held that in this situation, the federal courts' equi-
table jurisdiction encompasses reimbursement of expenditures on private special education.
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
141. John H., EHLR (LRP Publications) at 558:370.
142. See, e.g., Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., No. CivA 02-1716, 2003 WL
24052009 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 29, 2003); Matthew M., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10385, at *12.
143. Appleton Area Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR (LRP Publications) 87 (SEA Wis. 2001).
144. See, e.g., Dublin Unified Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR (LRP Publications) 107 (SEA Cal.
2000); Willamette Educ. Serv. Dist., 32 IDELR (LRP Publications) 22 (SEA Or. 2000); Apple-
ton Area Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR (LRP Publications) at 87; Unified Sch. Dist. of De Pere, 21
IDELR (LRP Publications) 1206, 1207 (SEA Wis. 1994).
145. Unified Sch. Dist. ofDe Pere, 21 IDELR (LRP Publications) at 1207.
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an appeal.'4 6 This relevant right illustrates that although the sub-
stantive rights belong to the child, the parent has the right and,
more importantly, the responsibility to initiate Stage I and Stage II
of the dispute resolution process to safeguard their disabled child's
educational well-being.1
47
Courts and hearing officers faced with non-attorney parents act-
ing as lay advocates' for their child in court have interpreted the
parent role so as to maximize its effectiveness, consistent with the
parent role as proxy for their child's rights, rather than as advo-
cates for their own rights. In litigation in which a plaintiff is
asserting her own rights (perhaps seeking damages for her injuries
sustained in a car accident), the plaintiff may choose to proceed
pro se. In contrast, under the IDEA, most courts thus hold that
non-attorney parents may not act pro se on behalf of their children
in court proceedings. 48 The Third Circuit has specifically held that
non-attorney parents may not act pro se due to the importance of
the children's rights at issue.149 That court reasoned that, although
the IDEA grants parents varied procedural rights to stay involved in
their children's education, it did not grant them substantive rights
such as acting pro se.' 50 Another federal court reasoned that it
would be wrong to bind the interests of children who lack experi-
enced counsel.15' The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that the IDEA
allows parent to bring suit on behalf of their children but does not
give them authority to act as their counsel.
52
146. Id.
147. Courts have rejected arguments that persons other than parents or schools have
standing, since the IDEA grants standing exclusively to them. Gehman v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 702 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that an insurer lacked standing to
invoke EHA claim against a school district); Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Putnam County, 24 E Supp. 2d 808 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (holding that an advocacy group
lacked standing to bring suit directly against a school district).
148. See, e.g., Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1998);
Shcvtsov v. L. Unificd Sch. Dist., 134 E3d 379 (9th Cir. 1998); Wenger v. Canastota Ccnt.
Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1998); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d
576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997); Carter-Thomas v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CivA3:02CV1853-P,
2003 WL 22304949 (N.D. Tex.July 23, 2003); Welch v. Bd. of Educ., 35 IDELR (LRP Publica-
tions) 247 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Scott M. v. Governor Wentworth Reg'l Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR
(LRP Publications) 1012 (D.N.H. 1997); Hayes v. Bd. of Educ., 38 IDELR (LRP Publica-
tions) 98 (D. Del. 1993). But see Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 247 (1st
Cir. 2003); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F Supp. 2d 1331, 1331 (N.D. Ga.
2003).
149. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231.
150. Id. at 227.
151. Welch, 35 IDELR (LRP Publications) at 248.
152. Devine, 121 F.3d at 581.
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The treatment of parents acting as advocates in IDEA adminis-
trative hearings is consistent with the court-imposed limits on pro
se parents in IDEA judicial proceedings. One federal court used
the language of the statute, or in this case, the lack of language, to
hold that non-attorney parents cannot represent their children in
IDEA lawsuits."' That court reasoned that the statute expressly
mentions that parents can represent their child at the administra-
tive phase of dispute resolution, yet makes no mention of
representation at the judicial stage, which is of course significantly
more legally complex.1 54 These cases reiterate that the underlying,
substantive rights at issue are the child's rather than the parent's.
Following through with this model of the parent in an IDEA
hearing serving as a proxy for the child's important substantive in-
terests, a parent who is also an attorney may be able to effectively
serve as advocate at the less formal administrative healing. But in
this situation, the parent/attorney is not truly acting as an attorney
but rather as hybrid advocate/proxy for the child. Thus, most
courts that have faced this issue hold that parents who are attor-
neys may represent their children in proceedings but cannot
receive attorney's fees if they prevail. 55 As an example, the Fourth
Circuit held that although parents have rights under the IDEA, the
real party in interest is the child, 5 6 and the role of parents is an ac-
commodation of the child's incapacity.' 57 This court held that the
parent is not acting pro se because the substantive rights belong to
the child, not the parent.5 The court found that the language of
the statute in providing fees "to the parents of a child or youth with
a disability who is the prevailing party" shows that the child is the
focus of IDEA 9 The parent in that case was not awarded fees be-
cause of the nature of a parent-child relationship.'9 Another
153. Coinsgru, 161 F.3d at 232.
154. See id.
155. See Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 E3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998); Matthew V. v. Dekalb County
Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp 609 (D.
Md. 1993); Mayerson v. DeBuono, 694 N.Y.S.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). But see Miller v. W.
Lafayette Comm. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). Note, however, that a close rela-
tive other than a parent may be awarded attorney's fees if acting on behalf of the child. See
Amy M. v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. 99-269-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20937, at *17
(D.N.H. 2000).
156. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263.
157. See id. The court also reasoned that attorney's fees should not be paid because at-
torney parents will be zealous advocates for their children without an award, making fees
unnecessary to ensure effective counsel. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (4) (B) (2000)).
160. See id.
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federal court held that Congress envisioned an agency relation-
ship, and not a parent-child relationship, when creating a provision
for reimbursement of attorney's fees.'6' This court reasoned that
because the language of IDEA extends protections to both the
parent and the child and because of the close relationship between
a parent and a child, the attorney/parent is essentially acting pro
se in the matter.
162
In sum, the IDEA itself and the bulk of the case law interpreting
it recognize the unique nature of the IDEA parent role. That role
is not one of exercising a set of substantive parenting rights. In-
stead, IDEA parents are given a set of procedural safeguards for
utilitarian reasons: they can act both as a proxy to enforce the edu-
cational rights of their child and as a partner jointly making
decisions with the school in order that their child actually receive
FAPE. This parent role is central to the IDEA's primary goal of
providing eligible students with effective educational programs.
Adoption or rejection of tolling for minors for IDEA claims must
be consistent with this special IDEA parent role and the educa-
tional effectiveness goal it seeks to promote.
IV. BORROWING ANALOGOUS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
PROVISIONS UNDER THE PRE-200 4 IDEA
A number of federal statutes do not include explicit time limita-
tions for bringing claims. 63 In such instances, courts must first
determine if the general federal default statute of limitations ap-
plies. If it does not, courts must then attempt to determine
Congress's intent, which often but not always is to borrow an
analogous state statute of limitations. Any borrowed statutes of
limitation must be consistent with the policy underlying the federal
statute at issue. Once a general statute of limitations (for example
a two-year tort statute of limitations) is borrowed, the borrowing
161. Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp 609, 611 (D. Md. 1993).
162. Seeid. at612.
163. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (citations omitted) (referring to
the commonplace congressional practice of writing statutes without specific statutes of limi-
tation). One commentator has noted that "[o]f the many gaps in the scheme of federal law,
few have so vexed the federal judiciary as those that result when Congress creates a federal
cause of action but fails to specify a period of limitations.... Such congressional omissions
have occurred with monotonous regularity .... " Abner Mikva & James Pfander, On the
Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual
Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE L.J. 393, 393 (1987).
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analysis must be performed again to determine if a tolling provi-
sion in that statute of limitations will also be adopted.
A. The "Default" Federal Statute of Limitations for
Claims Under Statutes Enacted After 1990
For federal statutes enacted after 1990 that do not include their
own time limits, Congress has enacted a general statute of limita-
tions, which requires claims to be brought within "4 years after the
cause of action accrues.""' This default federal statute of limita-
tions does not include language addressing tolling. As the IDEA
was enacted in 1975, it is not governed by this general default fed-
eral statute of limitations.
B. Gap-Filling by Borrowing Analogous Statutes of Limitation
Enforcement of § 1983165 and certain other federal civil rights
statutes is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that claims
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States .... but in all cases where they are ... defi-
cient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the [federal] court ... is held, so far as the same is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause ....166
The Supreme Court has applied this language to statute of limi-
tations issues arising under § 1983 claims, noting in one case that
to determine the applicable time limit "the settled practice has
been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not incon-
sistent with federal law or policy to do so."157 With regard to tolling, the
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
165. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
167. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). In that case, the Court also noted that this "borrowing analysis" inquiry involves both
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Court has specifically found that while normally a borrowed state
statute of limitations would include its tolling rules,' ts a separate
borrowing and policy analysis was required for tolling issues."
For the IDEA and other statutes not governed by § 1988, the
Court has performed a borrowing analysis quite similar to that per-
formed under § 1988. As a general matter in identifying an
appropriate statute of limitations in such cases, the Court held
that:
[O]ur task is to "borrow" the most suitable statute or other
rule of timeliness from some other source. We have generally
concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the
most closely analogous statute of limitations under state
law... In some circumstances, however, state statutes of limi-
tations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for enforcement of
federal law.... Hence, in some cases we have ... instead used
timeliness rules drawn from federal law-either express limi-
tations periods from related federal statutes, or such
alternatives as laches.
170
"length of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application."
Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
168. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1980).
169. Id. at 487. In this case, the plaintiff made the inconsistency argument, arguing that
the applicable state law's failure to toll while she pursued a related claim should not be bor-
rowed. Id. at 482-83. Emphasizing "[t] he importance of policies of repose," the Court found
lack of tolling while related claims were pursued was not inconsistent with federal law or
policy and thus determined the claim to be time-barred. Id. at 488. Specifically, the Court
noted that "a state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely be-
cause the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation." Id. (citation omitted). The Court
also noted that the "deterrence and compensation" policies underlying § 1983 are not
thwarted by applying time bars since plaintiffs can still, by filing timely and meritorious
claims, be compensated and thereby deter civil rights violations. Id. The Court rejected
uniformity and principals of federalism as grounds for judicially adding the tolling feature
to the state time bar scheme. Id. at 489-90; see aLso Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544
(1989) (holding that in a § 1983 claim brought by an inmate, borrowing analysis supported
application of a state tolling provision for period of disability that included incarceration);
Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (finding in a § 1983 class action that borrowing analy-
sis supported application of a territorial tolling law related to certification of the class).
The Court also has found that a single state statute of limitations should be borrowed for
all claims under a federal statute. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272-80 (holding that the relevant
state's three-year personal injury statute of limitations, rather than the two-year statute of
limitations for tort claims against government agencies, should be borrowed for federal civil
rights claims under § 1983, whether those claims were based on alleged search and seizure,
free speech, due process, or other constitutional or statutory violations).
170. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 160-62 (1983) (citations
omitted).
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In these cases, similar to the borrowing analysis under § 1988,
the Court has instructed that the primary goal is to ascertain Con-
gressional intent, ' and has told courts to be sure that the statute
of limitations identified for a federal statute is consistent with the
policies underlying that federal statute. 72 The difference between
this analysis and that under § 1988 is that in the former instance,
federal as well as state statutes of limitation may be borrowed.1
73
Indeed, in some cases involving non-§ 1988 federal statutes and
other laws, the Court has in fact borrowed a statute of limitations
from an analogous federal statute rather than turning to state law.
74
Some academic commentary suggests another approach: that fed-
eral courts, as a matter of federal common law, borrow from the
default four-year federal time limit as well as other explicit federal
time limits rather than from state law.'
7
5
C. Statutes of Limitation Under the Pre-2004 IDEA
1. Lack of Textual Time Limits in the IDEA-Prior to its
amendment in 2004, the IDEA and its regulations contained very
little language concerning time limits for plaintiffs initiating and
171. Seeid. at 158.
172. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367-71 (1977) (refusing to apply a
short state statute of limitations to claims brought by the EEOC to enforce Title VII because
doing so would frustrate effective enforcement of Title VII).
173. For example, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the
Court performed this analysis for tolling issues asserted in a § 1981 civil rights claim. Al-
though § 1981 is governed by § 1988, the Court mentioned § 1988 only to the extent that it
rejected the argument that there is "anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that
would justify special reluctance in applying state law." Id. at 464. The Court cited its prior
decisions, some of them pre-§ 1988, borrowing state statute of limitations for claims under
various federal statutes not governed by § 1988. Id. at 462 (citing cases applying state statutes
of limitation to claims under federal labor, banking, antitrust, and patent statutes). In John-
son, the Court held that the borrowed state time bar included its tolling provisions, which
meant that the plaintiffs claim was time-barred. Id. at 462-63. However, the Court noted
that "considerations of state law may be displaced where their application would be inconsis-
tent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration." Id. at 465.
174. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987);
West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162. When asked to determine
the appropriate statute of limitations for the federal common law duty of fair representation
claims by workers against unions, the Court identified the 180-day statute of limitations in
the federal labor relations statute as the most analogous one. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162. The
Court rejected an analogy to legal malpractice claims, in large part because analogizing to
legal malpractice would frustrate the prompt dispute resolution policies underlying federal
labor law, Id. at 167-68, and potentially render the labor grievance arbitration system un-
workable. Id. at 169.
175. Mikva & Pfander, supra note 163, at 396.
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prosecuting the IDEA's dispute resolution provisions. There was no
time limit for filing for due process hearings, nor for appealing
hearing decisions to court, nor for bringing civil actions generally.
Regulations set out a one-year deadline for initiating a complaint
with the state; three years if the claim is for compensatory
services. 176 Courts were permitted to reduce or deny tuition
reimbursement for a unilateral placement if the court found the
parents acted "unreasonably.",1  This presumably would include
unreasonable delay in seeking tuition reimbursement.
2. The Courts' General 1DEA Gap-Filling Approach-In the absence
of textual statutes of limitation, courts faced with IDEA statute of
limitations defenses are to follow the Supreme Court's analysis de-
scribed above to ascertain congressional intent. This often takes
the form of 1) borrowing from an analogous state statute of limita-
tions, 2) borrowing in appropriate cases from an analogous federal
statute of limitations, perhaps including the four-year general fed-
eral statute of limitations, or 3) equitable principles when
equitable remedies are sought, as is usually the case under the
IDEA. Courts must make this determination of congressional in-
tent for each borrowing issue, whether considering the appropriate
general time limit or the more specific issue of tolling for minors.
8
A detailed review of the various courts' analysis of the length of
time for bringing IDEA administrative or judicial claims is beyond
the scope of this Article. In general, however, the result has been a
crazy-quilt pattern varying from state to state. 79 In large part, courts
have tended to identify and adopt the analogous state torts 80 stat-
176. 34 C.F.R. § 300.662(c) (2004). The regulation allows a longer reasonable time if
the violation is continuing, and specifies a three year period for requests for compensatory
education. Id.
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10) (C) (iii) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d) (2004).
178. In fact, most courts faced with IDEA statute of limitations issues apparently have
not considered borrowing from federal statutes or equitable principles. See infra Part
IV.C.3.b. Even more distressingly, some courts have performed no borrowing analysis. See,
e.g.,jeffery Y v. St. Marys Area Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also infra
notes 218-221 and accompanying text. Others seemingly have followed automatically the
Court's borrowing analysis for § 1983 and other claims governed by § 1988, identifying the
most analogous state statute of limitation and then adopting it for IDEA claims if it is consis-
tent with IDEA law and policy. See, e.g., Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 E2d 119,
121 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); see also infra notes 210-237 and accompanying text. A number of
these courts have not performed a separate analysis for tolling provisions, although it is
clearly required. See, e.g., McKellar v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., No. 98-CV-4161, 1999 WL 124381, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1999); see also infra notes 218-237 and accompanying text.
179. Perry Zirkel & Peter Maher, The Statute of Limitations under the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act, 175 EDuc. L. REP. 1, 6-7 (2003).
180. It is not obvious that tort statutes of limitations are analogous to IDEA claims. First,
tort claims are based on common law, while IDEA claims are statutory. Second, and more
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utes of limitation (typically two to three years) for Stage I begin-
ning the IDEA dispute resolution process by filing for an IDEA due
process hearing.18' A recent state-by-state compilation shows sixteen
of twenty-three states addressing this issue adopting a two- or three-
year Stage I period. But, courts varied in adopted periods from
sixty days to five years.8 2 Courts have tended to identify and adopt
the state's statute of limitations for appealing administrative deci-
sions (typically thirty to 120 days) for Stage II appeals of IDEA due
process hearing officer decisions. The same recent state-by-state
compilation shows twenty of thirty-four states addressing this issue
adopted a 30-to-120-day Stage II period, but also varied in adopted
periods from thirty days to six years."8
While varying greatly, states thus typically provide several years
for resolution before further judicial appeal. Moreover, the time-
line for resolution of IDEA disputes involves not only Stages I and
II, but also the administrative decision-making period in between
Stage I and Stage II, as well as the judicial decision-making period
importantly, the parents in torts cases exercise only general parental roles as proxies for the
child, while under the IDEA, they partner with districts and exercise an exclusive role in
filing for hearings and judicial review. States that borrow these statutes as "analogous" are
not taking into consideration the difference in the role of the parents in a civil suit versus
the role of parents under the IDEA.
181. See generally JAMEs RAPP, EDUCATION LAw § 10.03[21][d] (2004); Allen Osborne,
Statutes of Limitation for Filing a Lawsuit Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A
State By State Analysis, 191 EDUC. L. REP. 545 (2004); Allen Osborne, Statutes of Limitation for
Filing a Lawsuit Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 106 EDUC. L. REP. 959
(1996) (focusing on Stage II time limits); Zirkel & Maher, supra note 179, at 6-7; Francis
Dougherty, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Applies to Civil Actions Brought in Federal
Court Under Education of the Handicapped Act (20 US.C. §§ 1400 et seq.) to Challenge Findings and
Decisions of State Administrative Agencies, 107 A.L.R. FED. 758 (2003).
182. Zirkel & Maher, supra note 179, at 6-7. In the eighteen states that have published
pertinent court decisions, only North Carolina has a sixty-day period, while the states com-
prising the Third Circuit have a relatively open-ended period. Id. Courts also have taken a
variety of approaches with regard to time limits for direct IDEA court claims-that is, those
that are filed without first filing for due process, such as attorney fee requests and claims
where administrative exhaustion is not required. Id. Most courts have held that the statute of
limitations borrowed from an analogous statute begins to run when the student or parent
has notice that the educational program designed for the child is not providing FAPE. See,
e.g., James v. Upper Arlington City Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2000); Providence Sch.
Dep't v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994);
Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 E3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994); Murphy v. Timber-
lane Reg'l Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 1186 (lst Cir. 1993); Gray v. Metts, 203 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Md.
2002); Essen v. Bd. of Educ. of Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 92-CV-1164(FJS) (GJD), 1996 WL
191948 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1996); G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H.
1992). In some jurisdictions, the parents also must have notice that the statute of limitations
began to run against them in order for a school district to raise the claim that the limitations
period had expired. See Zirkel & Maher, supra note 179, at 4 & n.24.
183. Zirkel & Maher, supra note 179, at 6-7. The limitations period is generally longer
for attorneys' fees than for other issues. Id.
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after Stage II. The intervening period between Stages I and II con-
sists of the hearing officer proceedings and, in seventeen states, a1. 184
second tier of administrative proceedings. At the other end, theperiod from judicial filing to final decision-given the congested
courts and their IDEA authorization to take additional evi-
dence"'8 -can add years to resolution of these individually
oriented, fact-based cases.186
3. Gap-Filling on Tolling Issues-The body of case law addressing
claims that statutes of limitation for IDEA claims are tolled for mi-
nors is a small one and largely contains little to no analysis of the
issue. Similar to the scenario laid out at the beginning of this Arti-
cle, these cases have typically involved compensatory education
claims by adult students, often nearing the end of their IDEA eligi-
bility, attempting to redress alleged and often long-ago IDEA
violations when they were minors. Courts have reached opposite
and largely cursory conclusions about whether the IDEA incorpo-
rates minority tolling provisions from state statutes of limitation.
a. Cases Rejecting Tolling for Minors for 1DEA Claims-The Ninth
Circuit appears to have been the first federal appeals court to ad-
dress the issue, and its analysis remains among the most thorough
and cogent. In Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, a
1987 decision involving a compensatory education claim by a
twenty-two-year-old autistic student for alleged Section 504 and
IDEA violations dating back ten years,187 the Ninth Circuit used the
Supreme Court's state law borrowing analysis to adopt a California
three-year statute of limitation for the IDEA claims at hand. How-
ever, the Alexopulos court did not adopt the part of the state
statute that provided for tolling while a prospective plaintiff is a
minor. The court found the tolling provision to be inconsistent
with IDEA policy. 8
184. Id. at 1 n.2. Although there are no research studies available due to the lack of
adequate archival data at state education agencies, the second author's experience as an
IDEA second-tier review officer and consultant in various states in such matters is that these
proceedings typically take significantly longer than the periods prescribed in the regulations
for each tier in 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2004)-forty-five days for the first tier and thirty days for
the second tier, not including transmission and extension periods.
185. See, e.g., Andriy Krahmal, Perry Zirkel & Emily Kirk, "Additional Evidence" Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. E ON C.L. & C.R. 201
(2004).
186. See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 35, at 44.
187. Alexopulos v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1987).
188. Id. at 555-56. For another case where a federal appeals court rejected a different
sort of tolling provision as inconsistent with the IDEA policy of prompt dispute resolution,
see Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting state
tolling provision involved with the filing of a parallel lawsuit in state court).
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that: "The [IDEA] is designed to
assure that representatives of handicapped children would
promptly assert the children's educational rights. To permit tolling
in favor of the children would undercut this federal policy.' 8 9 The
court offered two primary reasons in support of its rejection of toll-
ing, both of which focus on what is educationally best for disabled
students. First, assigning dispute resolution and other procedural
rights to parents furthers parental involvement in their children's
education. Second, doing so is consistent with efficiently resolving
any IDEA violations. The Ninth Circuit reviewed some of the
panoply of rights given to parents under the IDEA, from access to
records, notice of program changes, membership on their child's
team, notice of procedural rights, and the right to file for a due
process hearing.'90 The court also recognized that if an IDEA stu-
dent did not have a parent or guardian, the statute assigned these
rights to the surrogate parent whom the statute requires be ap-
pointed in this event. The court characterized the basis for the
assignment of these rights to parents, in particular the right to
bring a claim for their child, 9' as one of ensuring parental in-
volvement, which in turn is "essential to assure an appropriate
substantive educational program for a child.'
92
Second, the court noted that the IDEA "recognized that it is
critical to assure appropriate education for handicapped children
at the earliest time possible. Failure to act promptly could irre-
trievably impair a child's educational progress."' 93 The court
189. Alexopulos, 817 E2d at 555. While not addressing tolling issues specifically, other
courts faced with IDEA statute of limitations issues have emphasized the federal policy pre-
ferring prompt resolution of special education disputes, which educationally benefits IDEA
students. See, e.g., Ga. State Dep't of Educ. v. Derrick C., 314 F.3d 545, 549 (11th Cir. 2002)
(adopting a brief Stage II timeline to ensure that IDEA students receive appropriate educa-
tions); Cory D., 285 F.3d at 1298-99 ("The most effective means of ensuring disabled
children receive an education tailored to meet their specific needs is to provide prompt
resolution of disputes over [the] IEP. A brief limitations period guarantees students will
receive their statutorily prescribed education when they can most benefit from it. The IDEA
recognizes children develop quickly and once correct placement decisions can soon become
outdated."); Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 280 E Supp. 2d 447 (W.D. Pa. 2003). In
the view of the agency that enforces the IDEA, "the limited Federal resources under the Act
should be used to provide special education and related services and not be used to pro-
mote litigation of disputes." Assistance to States for the Education of Children With
Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities,
64 Fed. Reg. 12615 (Mar. 12, 1999).
190. Alexopulos, 817 F.2d at 556 (citations omitted).
191. The court distinguished the parent's own claim for reimbursement of tuition ex-
penses incurred on behalf of the child. Id. at 556 n.6 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 556.
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reasoned that Congress had acted on its "desire to obtain timely
and appropriate education for handicapped children by confer-
ring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents ...
[which] clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing
of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the al-
leged wrongdoing occurred." 94 The court also noted that IDEA
students who are legal adults may be able to bring claims that are
not time-barred for recent IDEA violations. 19
5
More recently, and in another compensatory education case, the
Eighth Circuit also rejected IDEA tolling for minor students, and for
largely the same reasons found in Alexopulos.116 In Strawn v. Missouri
State Board of Education, a case involving a request for compensatory
education for a severely disabled student for alleged IDEA viola-
tions dating back ten years, 197 the Eighth Circuit performed the
Supreme Court's borrowing analysis set forth above'99 and identi-
fied strong federal policies in favor of quick resolution of IDEA
claims' 99 as well as parental involvement in their children's educa-
tion. The Eighth Circuit thus adopted a state two-year statute of
limitations for civil rights claims rather than the more general state
five-year statute of limitations or laches." This same federal policy
favoring prompt dispute resolution was identified as the reason for
rejecting tolling based on minor status. 2 0 1
Although not cited in Strawn, a federal district court within the
Eighth Circuit had previously rejected the tolling provision for mi-
nors in the state statute of limitations it adopted for IDEA claims.
In Smith ex rel. Townsend v. Special School District No. 1, the federal
district court of Minnesota cited Supreme Court precedent indicat-
ing that tolling provisions of borrowed state statutes of limitations
194. Id.
195. Id. at 556 n.7 (citation omitted). The court reserved the issue of tolling when an
EHA student is not represented. Id.
196. Strawnv. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 210 F.3d954, 958 (8thCir. 2000).
197. Id. at 956.
198. Id. at 957.
199. The court also emphasized the impact on the educational programs provided to
IDEA students, noting that "children protected by the IDEA benefit greatly from quick reso-
lution of disputes because lost education is a substantial harm." Id.
200. Id. at 956-57. The Eighth Circuit already had applied the five-year statute of limita-
tions to § 1983 claims. Id. at 957 (citing Garrett v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1998)).
The dissent would have applied the five-year time limit, reasoning that the two-year time
limit frustrates federal policy. Id. at 959 (HeaneyJ., dissenting in part). The dissent does not
address the issue of tolling during the period when the student was a minor.
201. Id. at 958 (majority opinion). The court reserved the issue of tolling when the par-
ents were not involved in the IEP process or the parents "intentionally acted contrary to the
interests of the child." Id. at 958 n.7.
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should not be adopted if they would be inconsistent with federal
policy. 12 As to federal IDEA policy, the court found that "[p] rompt
resolution of IDEA disputes is imperative because of the harm
caused to the disabled child by delay in establishing an appropriate
program,"2 3 and, specifically with regard to tolling, that borrowing
the state tolling provision for minors "would be completely incom-
patible with the federal policy of prompt resolution of IDEA
disputes. '' 204 Finally, the district court noted the large-scale impact
of adopting tolling for minors, "since an IDEA claim will almost
always accrue to someone younger than 18, the tolling provision is
inconsistent with the cause of action."
20 5
Finally, a federal district court in Michigan implied it would not
adopt tolling for minors. In finding that the Supreme Court bor-
rowing analysis supported borrowing the state "tolling for
disability" provision in the specific case of a severely disabled adult
IDEA student, the court noted that federal IDEA policy favoring
prompt dispute resolution would not be thwarted by adopting toll-
ing for the small subset of IDEA students "who are severely mentally
impaired., 20 6 This lies in contrast with tolling for "[t]he vast major-
ity of [IDEA] students,"207 which "would not result in opening the
floodgates of stale cases."208 Of course, tolling based upon minority
status, or disability generally, would open those very floodgates.209
202. 24 IDELR (LRP Publications) 1003, 1012 n.l (D. Minn. 1996) (citing Bd. of Re-
gents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980)), affd on other grounds, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir.
1999).
203. Id. at 1007 (citing IDEA legislative history).
204. Id. at 1012 n.ll (citing Alexopulos v. S.E Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th
Cir. 1987)). The court also recognized that "an IDEA claim will almost always accrue to
someone younger than 18, [hence] the tolling provision is inconsistent with the cause of
action." Id.
205. Id. The age of legal majority in almost every state is eighteen. See Legal Informa-
tion Institute, Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia and Puerto Rico Governing Emancipation
of Minors, http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/TableEmancipation.htm (last visited Aug. 15,
2005). But see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-21, -27 (2005). The vast majority of IDEA students are
under the age of eighteen. See infra note 248. IDEA eligibility ends with the earlier of high
school graduation or the student's twenty-first birthday. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(a) (2000); 34
C.ER. § 300.122(a) (3) (2004).




209. See New Lothrop Area Pub. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR (LRP Publications) 174 (SEA
Mich. 2004) (rejecting tolling for minors and any implication by Wayne County, 56 F. Supp.
2d 807, that such tolling would be appropriate) ("The structure of the IDEA... clearly evi-
dences intent on the part of Congress that the active role of the parent ... means that the
parent has the authority to act and make decisions on behalf of the child .... Accordingly,
the child is bound by those decisions.").
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b. Cases Adopting Tolling for Minors for IDEA Claims-The Fourth
Circuit adopted tolling for minor IDEA students in Shook v. Gaston
County Board of Education. That case involved a student's third-party
beneficiary claim for reimbursement of health insurance benefits
from her parents' policy that had been used to partially pay for her
special education program in a private residential school.210 While
citing some of the relevant Supreme Court precedent on borrow-
ing analysis, the Fourth Circuit nowhere referred to (or
performed) the part of the analysis that focused on consistency of
the borrowed state statute of limitations with federal (i.e. IDEA)
policy. The Fourth Circuit did recognize the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion to reject tolling,"' and noted its disagreement, reasoning
instead that IDEA suits are "properly maintained both by the child
and its parents," consequently tolling on behalf of the minor child
"should not deter the parents from bringing a suit at an earlier
,,212time.
Several federal district courts in Pennsylvania have also adopted
IDEA tolling for legal minors or have engaged in analysis that pro-
duces a similar result. These district courts are part of the Third
Circuit, which has not yet addressed tolling issues under the IDEA,
but has taken a unique approach on other IDEA statutes of limita-
213tion issues. First, that court has found that equitable principles
should govern, and accordingly a laches-like reasonableness analy-
sis defines the Stage I time limit, at least for tuition reimbursement
claims.214 Second, the Third Circuit has used the Supreme Court
borrowing analysis to identify a state two-year personal injury stat-
ute of limitation as the appropriate one for Stage II administrative
210. 882 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1989).
211. Id.atl2ln.2.
212. Id. The Fourth Circuit appeared to assume that rejecting tolling for minors also
meant rejecting tolling for disability in legal adults. The court reasoned that under the
school's approach, a high-functioning disabled student who was a legal adult could bring
timely claims, while an incapacitated student could not. Id. at 121-22.
213. For a more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's approach, see Perry Zirkel,
The Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act: Is Montour Myopic?, 12
WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003).
214. Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1994) (failing to
mention or apply Supreme Court borrowing analysis in determining that a New Jersey par-
ent's claim for tuition reimbursement filed more than one year after unilateral placement is
unreasonable and thus untimely); see alsoJeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d
272, 280 n.16 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Bernardsville's reasonableness approach as the standard
for Pennsylvania cases); cf Montour Sch. Dist. v. S.T., 805 A.2d 29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
(setting the Stage I limit for Pennsylvania compensatory education claims at one year with
an extension to two years if there are mitigating circumstances).
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appeals to court, but not for Stage I filing for due process. 5 Third,
and perhaps most unusually, that court has held that compensatory
education claims accrue "when the school knows or should know
that the student is receiving an inappropriate education ,'' 6 result-
ing in an indefinite statute of limitations for those claims.1 7
The earliest of these cases, Jeffery Y v. St. Marys Area School Dis-
trict, was a suit for damages for alleged violations of the IDEA and
other laws."" The Jeffery Y court simply noted that the relevant two-
year state statute of limitations included a provision for tolling for
minors. 9 In its brief opinion, the court did not cite to nor apply
the Supreme Court borrowing analysis, nor did it offer any other
reasoning or citation to authority in support of its conclusion.
Similarly, in McKellar v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, an-
other federal district court referred to the Supreme Court state law
borrowing analysis to identify the state two-year statute of limita-cla 2ms Like the JeffeyY
tions as the appropriate one for IDEA claims ery
court, the McKellar court then simply referenced the tolling provi-
sion under the state law without applying the borrowing analysis to
the tolling provision, nor offering any analysis in support of the
tolling provision's applicability. 22' Susavage v. Bucks County Schools
215. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Su-
preme Court borrowing analysis to find a New Jersey claim for compensatory education
most analogous to a NewJersey two-year statutes of limitation for personal injury claims and
claims under the state Tort Claims Act, and holding that it runs from the date of the final
administrative decision); see alsoJeremy H., 95 F.3d at 280-81.
216. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 250. The Ridgewood court decided a New Jersey
claim. However, since accrual is an issue of federal law rather than one borrowed from the
states, this analysis presumably would apply elsewhere within the Third Circuit.
217. Courts disagree about the extent to which the Ridgewood decision governs Stage I
limitations for IDEA compensatory education claims. Compare Amanda A. v. Coatesville Area
Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 04-4184, 2005 WL 426090, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2005) (finding that
Ridgewood rejects a Stage I statute of limitations for compensatory education claims), Jona-
than T. v. Lackawanna Trail Sch. Dist., No. 3:03CV522, 2004 WL 384906 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26,
2004), and Jonathan H. v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR (LRP Publications) 261
(E.D. Pa. 2004), with Montour Sch. Dist. v. S.T., 805 A.2d 29, 37-38 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 2002)
(finding that Ridgewood addressed only the Stage II limit for Pennsylvania compensatory
education claims and adopting a Stage I one-year limit for such claims with an extension to
two years if there are mitigating circumstances).
218. 967 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
219. Id. at 855.
220. McKellar v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., No. 98-CV-4161, 1999 WL 124381, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 23, 1999). The court also conflated its analysis of IDEA timelines with those for § 504,
the ADA, and § 1983. Id.
221. Id. The court did note that the tolling provision would apply to the student's claim,
but not the parent's related claims. Id. At least one other federal district court has adopted
tolling based on minority status without any analysis or discussion. See Mason v. Schenectady
Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215, 220 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (centering analysis on identification of
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Intermediate Unit No. 2Yf 22 involved claims for money damages under
the IDEA and numerous statutes related to a disabled student's
death on a school bus. The district court performed a single bor-
rowing analysis for the statutes of limitations for four federal
statutes-the IDEA, § 504, the ADA, and § 1983.223 The Susavage
court then incorrectly stated that it must also incorporate any rele-
vant state tolling rules,2 4 and cited § 1983 precedent to borrow
Pennsylvania tolling provisions for minors.25 As to the tolling pro-
vision, the court performed no actual analysis of consistency with
federal IDEA (or § 504, ADA, or § 1983) policy nor other borrow-
ing analysis.
More recently, a federal district court in Pennsylvania indirectly
addressed the tolling issue in Jonathan T v. Lackawanna Trail School
District.226 Jonathan T involved a claim for compensatory education
for alleged IDEA and other violations dating back thirteen years by
a then twenty-year-old former IDEA student who had dropped out
of school three years earlier.227 The due process hearing officer and
state review officer panel dismissed the claim as time-barred,228 but
the federal district court reversed.
The Jonathan T court's reasoning began with a reference to the
Supreme Court borrowing analysis,22 9 and then analyzed Stage II
timeline issues under the unique Third Circuit precedent dis-
cussed above.230 As to Stage I, however, rather than performing a
borrowing analysis, the court reviewed intra-circuit precedent on
other points, and then rejected a two-year statute of limitations as
an appropriate statute of limitations for IDEA court claims where administrative exhaustion
is not required).
222. No. CIV.A. 00-6217, 2002 WL 109615 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 22, 2002).
223. Id. at *22.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Jonathan T. v. Lackawanna Trail Sch. Dist., No. 3:03CV522, 2004 WL 384906 (M.D.




230. The court noted that the Third Circuit has not conclusively identified an IDEA
statute of limitations for Pennsylvania claims. Id. The court then correctly referenced Third
Circuit precedent that the Stage II statute of limitations begins to run from the "completion
of the state administrative process" rather than the violation of the IDEA. Id.
231. While the borrowing analysis set out by the Supreme Court typically involves iden-
tifying an appropriate state statute of limitations, the Third Circuit instead identified an
equity-based "reasonableness" approach for some cases. SeeJeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon
Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 n.16 (3d Cir. 1996).
As to compensatory education claims specifically, the Third Circuit apparently has an in-
definite statute of limitations because of its accrual standard. See Jonathan T, 2004 WL
384906, at *2 (citing intra-circuit district court precedent to distinguish the equitable one-
[VOL. 38:4
For Wom the School Bell Tolls
appropriate for Stage I. The court then inexplicably relied on rules
for eligibility for special education services, rather than examining
statutes of limitation and tolling provisions, to find that compensa-
tory education claims are available and timely until the student's
IDEA eligibility ends at age twenty-one. The (former) student
plaintiff in Jonathan T filed his due process claim more than two
years after attaining majority status, and thus would be time-
barred even if a two-year statute of limitations was tolled until he
became a legal adult. However, the Jonathan T court found his
claim was not time-barred,2 3' noting that as a twenty-year-old at the
time he filed for due process, Jonathan T. was eligible under state
statute and the IDEA to receive educational services since he had
not yet turned twenty-one. 34 The court then apparently concluded
from this eligibility to receive education services that "the statute of
limitations in special education matters should not begin to run
against the child until he or she reaches the age of twenty-one." 35
The Jonathan T. opinion never actually refers to nor discusses
tolling based upon minority status. However, as a fallback position,
the court suggested that application of equitable tolling principles
also compelled the court's conclusion that Jonathan T.'s compen-
satory education claims were not time-barred. The court's
reasoning appears confused in its understanding of these equitable
tolling principles. The court suggested that equitable tolling was
appropriate so that "the school district not benefit from its perva-
sive violations [of IDEA procedural safeguards] .236 It did not refer
year statute of limitations for parent IDEA claims of tuition reimbursement); see alsoJona-
than H. v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR (LRP Publications) 261 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(following Jonathan T on this point); Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 628,
634 (M.D. Pa. 2000). Therefore, it may be appropriate to perform separate statute of limita-
tions analyses for parent tuition reimbursement and student compensatory education IDEA
claims.
232. Jonathan T, 2004 WL 384906, at *1 (noting that the plaintiff was born July 16,
1981, and filed a request for an administrative special education due process hearing on
May 2, 2002).
233. It would thus appear that even with tolling based on minority status, the claim
would be time-barred by the two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations identified by the
Jeffery Y and McKellar courts for Pennsylvania-based IDEA claims.
234. Jonathan T, 2004 WL 384906, at *3 (citations omitted).
235. Id. at *3. The court rejected the school's argument that the statute should begin
running when Jonathan left school at age eighteen. Id. at *3 n.4.
Another federal district court in Pennsylvania has cited and uncritically adopted the Jona-
than T court's approach, ruling without further reasoning or analysis that "[w]ith regard to
a compensatory education, ... the statute of limitations in special education mailers [sic]
should not begin to run against the chld until he or she reaches the age of twenty-one."
William S. v. Upper St. Clair Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR (LRP Publications) 35 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
236. Jonathan T, 2004 WL 384906, at *3.
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to any of the exceptional circumstances that trigger equitable toll-
ing set forth in the Third Circuit opinion it cited.237
4. Analysis-Courts will continue to address tolling issues under
the pre-2004 amendments IDEA. The 2004 amendments, including
the new statutes of limitations described below, are not effective
untilJuly 1, 2005.238 Hence, not-yet-decided claims filed prior to the
2004 amendments, as well as new claims filed after the amend-
ments were enacted in December 2004 but before they take effect
in July 2005, will be governed by the pre-2004 amendments IDEA.
As discussed earlier, the IDEA dispute resolution process is a
lengthy one, and it will likely be years before there are final deci-
sions on this set of claims.
a. The Required Borrowing Analysis-The Supreme Court has pro-
vided substantial guidance and instruction to courts faced with
these issues. A borrowing analysis is to be performed. The Court
has clearly instructed that tolling provisions of borrowed statutes of
limitation are not automatically borrowed; a separate borrowing
239analysis must be performed for the tolling provision at issue.
Equally clear is the proposition that the statute of limitations bor-
rowed for one statute is not necessarily the appropriate time limit
to borrow for other statutes in the same case, although they may
240cover similar topics or claims.
The case law to date on tolling under the IDEA is limited both as
to quantity and as to depth of reasoning. In light of the Supreme
Court's clear guidance, it is puzzling that some courts, notably
some of the federal district courts in Pennsylvania, have not fol-
lowed the prescribed analytic approach. Rather than performing
the policy analysis required by the Court to determine if a tolling
provision should be borrowed, the Jeffery Y, McKellar, and Susavage
courts automatically adopted the tolling provision for minors in
the Pennsylvania statute of limitations.41
237. Id. (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also M.D. v.
Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that equitable tolling
is applicable where a school failed to give parents notice of their IDEA procedural rights,
and declining to extend a state equitable tolling provision to the parents' IDEA claim be-
cause to do so would frustrate federal IDEA policy of "expeditious resolution of... disputes"
by "permitting claims to be brought long after their accrual date"); R.S. v. District of Colum-
bia, 292 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2003).
238. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 302, 118
Stat. 2647, 2803.
239. See supra note 169.
240. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
241. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
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Moreover, the Susavage and McKellar courts did a single borrow-
ing analysis for claims made under four very different statutes-the
IDEA, § 504, the ADA, and § 1983. This single analysis ignores the
obvious: congressional intent concerning time limits likely differed
for these four statutes, which were enacted as much as a century
apart,242 and serve very different ends. Performing a single analysis
is also inappropriate since § 1983 borrowing is governed by § 1988,
while borrowing under the other three statutes is not.2 43 Moreover,
the four statutes are structured differently: the IDEA is set up as a
grant program, in contrast to the unfunded civil rights mandates of
the ADA and § 1983.244 The four statutes' dispute resolution proc-
esses also differ greatly,2 45 and they have very different remedial
246
schemes.
Section 504, the ADA, and § 1983 cover large groups of persons
regardless of age.247 Given the broad coverage of these statutes, toll-
ing for legal minors would affect only a small subset of claims
under them, while the borrowed statute of limitations would con-
tinue to set a time limit for most claims. In contrast, the IDEA
covers only a subset of disabled students aged three to twenty-one,
242. Section 1983 was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Sec-
tion 504 was part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The IDEA was
enacted in 1975. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000). The ADA was enacted in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2000).
243. See supra Part IV.B.
244. See supra Part III.A.
245. For example, the IDEA requires administrative exhaustion and sets up a formal
administrative hearing with limited judicial review. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g), (1) (2000). In
contrast, § 504 and the ADA make informal complaint processes available but do not re-
quire using them before filing a court claim. See 34 C.ER. § 100.7 (2004) (stating that
alleged § 504 violations may be the subject of OCR complaints); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (2)
(2000) (discussing private judicial claims under § 504); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000) (adopting
§ 504 enforcement mechanisms for ADA title II); id. at § 12188 (discussing DOJ complaints
and private lawsuits available under ADA Title III). Section 1983 recourse is exclusively in
the courts. See42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
246. Equitable remedies are available under § 504, the ADA, and § 1983, but money
damages are the typical remedy. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (stating that under ADA Title III pu-
nitive damages are not available and that compensatory damages are limited to suits brought
by the government); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187-88 (2002) (finding that compen-
satory but not punitive damages are available under § 504 and ADA Title II). Under the
IDEA, the remedies are primarily, if not exclusively, equitable. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
992,1020 n.24 (1984). But seeW.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
247. Section 1983 covers all "persons" whose constitutional or certain other federal
rights are violated under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The ADA covers dis-
abled persons, among others, in their capacities as employees and as patrons of places of
public accommodation. Id. at § 12182. Section 504 covers disabled employees of schools and
disabled students. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2004).
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more than ninety-five percent of whom are legal minors.48 Tolling
for minors would thus have the practical effect of wholesale oblit-
eration of the limitations period for IDEA claims.2 49 Adult IDEA
students could file claims dating back to their preschool years
unless their parents had done so already.
Finally, § 504, the ADA, and § 1983 claims are assigned to the al-
legedly injured party, whether adult or minor. In contrast, the
IDEA explicitly assigns the right to initiate the IDEA dispute reso-
lution process to parents. Moreover, none of the other three
statutes establish the special parent proxy and partner role con-
tained in the IDEA.2° To whatever extent tolling applies under
them, § 504 and the ADA do not provide a comparable and com-
prehensive special parental role. Rather, § 504 and the ADA are
civil rights acts specific to the members of the protected class,
which may include parents separately in such circumstances as al-
leged retaliation but which do not provide a detailed role for
parents from the eligibility stage to the dispute resolution stage of
the child's education. 5'
The Jonathan T opinion and its progeny are of special concern.
The Jonathan T court identified the likely applicable two-year
Pennsylvania statute of limitations from precedent that had used
the borrowing analysis. 2 The claims in the case were for compen-
satory education claims, dating back more than ten years, made by
a twenty-year-old student who had been a legal adult for more than
two years at the time he filed his claims. The Jonathan T court
248. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT tb]. AA1 (2002),
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2002/appendix-a-ptl.pdf. Dur-
ing 2001-02, for example, 95.62% of IDEA students were minors. Id. (6,096,007 out of
6,375,400).
249. One court appears to have recognized this difference, adopting tolling in a specific
case involving a severely disabled student, but distinguishing and rejecting wholesale tolling
for all disabilities as an improper opening of the floodgates. Wayne County Reg'l. Educ.
Scr. Agency v. Pappas, 56 F Supp. 2d 807, 817 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Since all IDEA students
are disabled, wholesale tolling for disability would open the floodgates 100%. Id. Wholesale
tolling for minors would open those very same floodgates at a more than ninety-five percent
level. See supra note 248.
250. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.1-2.
251. The ADA regulations do not specifically address the child's schooling, much less
the parents' role in the process. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.102-.178 (Tide II); id. at §§ 36.104-505
(Tide III). The § 504 regulations only refer to the parent's role briefly based on the overlap
with FERPA and the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2004) (mentioning parents only with
respect to the right to review the child's records and the "opportunity for participation" in
the due process hearing).
252. Jonathan T. v. Lackawanna Trail Sch. Dist., No. 3:03CV522, 2004 WL 384906, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 230-231.
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blithely announced that the claims were timely since the student
had not yet turned twenty-one and thus had not yet exhausted his
eligibility for special education. The court inexplicably relied on
special education eligibility age rules to determine timeliness of
IDEA claims and never mentioned the Pennsylvania tolling provi-
sion, much less performed any borrowing analysis, nor any analysis
253
of consistency with IDEA policy as to that tolling provision. Un-
der this reasoning, apparently any Pennsylvania IDEA student who
is not yet twenty-one can file timely claims concerning her special
education program, beginning with the preschool IEPs. In fact,
Jonathan T apparently contemplates that turning twenty-one only
starts the running of the statute of limitations clock,2 4 and thus
even older adult former students will be able to file timely claims.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Shook to adopt tolling for
minors is a somewhat more reasoned approach. Shook did cite rele-
vant Supreme Court precedent on borrowing analysis, but nowhere
referred to (nor performed) the part of the analysis which focused
on consistency of the borrowed state statute of limitations with fed-
eral IDEA policy. The Fourth Circuit's reasoning relied instead on
the premise that IDEA claims are "properly maintained both by the
child and its parents" and a statement that tolling on behalf of mi-
nors would not deter parents from promptly filing claims.255 For the
reasons described above, Shook's premise that both students and
parents are given the right to file IDEA claims is simply not accu-
rate.256 The substantive (FAPE and other) rights under the IDEA
are the student's. However, the IDEA explicitly assigns the right to
file for a hearing to parents, which by definition only include stu-
dents to the extent parent rights may transfer to them when they
become legal adults.
b. IDEA Policy and the Appropriateness of Borrowing Tolling Provi-
sions-Notably, those courts that have a) done the federal IDEA
policy review as part of the borrowing analysis, b) performed this
analysis for IDEA claims separately from those under other stat-
utes, and c) analyzed the tolling provision separately (namely the
Eighth and Ninth circuits in Strawn and Alexopulos respectively as
well as the federal district court in Smith), have all rejected tolling
for minors. In other words, those courts that have performed the
253. Id. at "1-4.
254. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 235.
255. Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 119, 121 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); see also
supra note 212 and accompanying text.
256. If tolling applied, Congress would have had little need to include provisions in the
statute for parents to initiate due process.
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correct analysis have consistently rejected tolling for minors under
the IDEA. In so doing, the courts have, to varying degrees, identi-
fied three IDEA policy concerns which are inconsistent with
borrowing a tolling provision for minors: 1) the unique role and
responsibilities the IDEA assigns parents, 2) the IDEA policy of re-
solving disputes promptly, which in turn enhances efficient
allocation of limited educational resources, and 3) that the impact
of tolling for minors would essentially negate any timelines in the
IDEA.
i. The 1DEA Parent Role-The most thoroughly reasoned of these
opinions, Alexopulos, correctly recognized (but did not comprehen-
sively address) the central role of parents under the IDEA.17
Alexopulos reviewed some of the panoply of rights assigned to par-
ents under the statute as well as the statutory provisions designed
to ensure that all IDEA students had a (surrogate or other) parent
to assert these rights."' Most importantly, the court recognized the
utilitarian basis for the assignment of these rights to parents, in
particular the right to bring a claim for their child,5 as one of en-
suring parental involvement. This involvement is, in turn,
"essential to assure an appropriate substantive educational pro-
gram for a child."
2 60
As the Ninth Circuit noted, the special comprehensive role of
the parents under IDEA, including the right to file for due process
hearings and judicial review, shows that the IDEA is distinct from
other legal contexts where tolling is based on the generic defini-
tion of disability.2 6' Thus, Congress arguably considered not only
the applicable reason of infancy, or the child's age being below
eighteen, 26 2 but also the special, narrower definition of disability
2 63
in according parents a special, central role that includes the right
and responsibility to initiate the administrative hearing/judicial
review mechanism 26 that gives rise to the issue of statute of limita-
265tions. Case law in various other IDEA contexts also recognizes
this critical right and responsibility of the parents and provides
support for disallowing tolling of the limitations periods under the
257. Alexopulos v. S.E Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 556 (9th Cir. 1987).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 555-56.
260. Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
261. See supra notes 14, 31.
262. In the limited case where the individual with a disability is eighteen or over, Con-
gress has provided the special, qualified transfer provisions. See supra Part III.B.2.j.
263. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (A)-(B) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (2004).
264. See supra Part III.B.2.i.
265. See supra Parts III.A., III.B.I., III.B.2.
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Act. These contexts include the directly applicable case law on fil-
ing for hearings, court decisions in various partially applicable
categories such as non-custodial parents' rights, and parents repre-
senting their child pro se. 266 These cases emphasize the special role
that parents have in triggering and implementing the dispute reso-
lution mechanism to enforce the IDEA with respect to their child.
They also emphasize the parental role by illustrating that only
those parents with legal custody can trigger some of the most es-
sential parent rights. Thus, even though the child is the true party
in interest in IDEA suits, the parent has the responsibility to exer-
cise procedural rights to ensure that their child is receiving FAPE.
Tolling of the statute of limitations would negate this special pa-
rental role.
In the case of tuition reimbursement claims, tolling would also
produce a seemingly nonsensical result in the case of tuition reim-
bursement, which represents a significant segment of special
education litigation at both the hearing/review officer and court
stages.267 These claims are clearly made by the parents for reim-
bursement of expenses incurred in trying to ensure their child
received FAPE when the public schools were not providing it. If
tolling for minors applied, the parents' tuition reimbursement
claim would be tolled, even though it is the parents who made the
unilateral placement and who would receive reimbursement.
The partner dimension of the special IDEA parent role also is
inconsistent with tolling IDEA claims for minors. As "equal partici-
pants along with school personnel, in developing, reviewing, and
revising the IEP for their child," parents are joint decision-makers
with schools in developing their child's education program.2  If
tolling were allowed for minors, claims would be available to stu-
dents for all violations except those about which their parents had
already filed claims at some point in the past. Thus, the tolled
claims would involve alleged violations in which the student's par-
ents were joint decision-makers, and with which the student's
parents presumably agreed. Hence the student would be filing
tolled claims that not infrequently would be challenging decisions
in which their parents participated and with which their parents
agreed. This scenario is in marked contrast, for example, to a
medical malpractice claim tolled while the injured patient was a
266. See cases cited supranotes 148, 155.
267. See, e.g., Thomas Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement
Claims: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001).
268. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, No. 5 (2004).
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minor. In that case, the plaintiff is suing a stranger. In the case of
tolled IDEA claims, the parents would not be a defending party,
but the claim would attack decisions the parents helped to make.
This scenario has the potential for harm to intra-family relations
on the one hand and for collusion between the student claimant
and her parents on the other.
If Congress believed parent participation to be important in the
special education process, it would seem counteractive to allow
parents to do nothing for their child when problems arise. Tolling
essentially allows problems to persist for years without anything
being done. If Congress intended for parents to be involved, that
involvement must include ensuring their child receives FAPE as
quickly as possible, and not allowing the child to languish in an
unsuccessful educational program. Despite the suggestion to the
contrary by the Shook court,2 6 9 tolling might actually give some par-
ents an incentive not to initiate due process in order to preserve
their child's right to later file an IDEA claim. It must be remem-
bered that the primary purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that all
children eligible for special education receive FAPE . If a parent
thinks that her twelve-year-old child's educational program is inap-
propriate, she should not be allowed to continue with the program
for six years and then bring a suit. If the program truly does not
provide FAPE, it is not only important to the school to be able to
effectively allocate resources2 71 by promptly being put on notice
and having a chance to make changes, but more importantly the
student needs to receive appropriate education sooner rather than
272later.
ii. Prompt Dispute Resolution and Efficient Resource Allocation-The
Ninth Circuit also found that borrowing the state tolling provision
for minors was inconsistent with the IDEA's policy of prompt dis-
pute resolution.273 That court correctly viewed prompt resolution of
269. See supra note 212.
270. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000); 34 C.FR. § 300.13 (2004).
271. In the view of the Department of Education, the agency that enforces the IDEA,
"the limited Federal resources under the Act should be used to provide special education
and related services and not be used to promote litigation of disputes." Assistance to States
for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for
Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12615 (Mar. 12, 1999).
272. A recent decision echoes the Strawn court's analysis, holding that Congress in-
tended for parents to be actively involved in their child's education and expeditious in any
IDEA concerns. Apache Junction Unified Scb. Dist., 39 IDELR (LRP Publications) 49 (SEA
Ariz. 2003) (citing Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. of Ed., 210 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2000)).
273. See Alexopulos v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the Education of the Handicapped Act-which Congress re-titled the IDEA in 1990-
was designed to assure that parents would promptly assert their children's rights).
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disputes as a means to an educational end: assigning dispute reso-
lution and other procedural rights to parents furthers parental
involvement in their children's education, and doing so is consis-
tent with efficiently resolving any IDEA violations. The court noted
that the IDEA "recognized that it is critical to assure appropriate
education for handicapped children at the earliest time possible.
Failure to act promptly could irreparably impair a child's educa-
tional progress."2 74 The court reasoned that Congress had acted on
its "desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handi-
capped children by conferring substantial substantive and
procedural rights on parents ... [which] clearly indicates that it
did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the
children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred."
2 75
Tolling would defeat this purpose, to the detriment of the student
not receiving FAPE when she will most benefit from it, and to the
detriment of other children with and without disabilities, whose
resources for educational purposes will become even more lim-
ited,276 as recognized by the Department of Education, the agency
that enforces the IDEA. 77
iii. Impact of Adopting Tolling for Minors--Finally, within this
group of correctly decided cases, the Smith court also recognized
the magnitude of the impact of tolling for minors on IDEA litiga-
tion. As that court noted, tolling of IDEA claims for minors would
mean that IDEA cases need not be brought until some period after
the student reaches age eighteen, thus effectively negating any
statute of limitations. For most if not all of the child's education
under the IDEA, the parent could choose not to file for a hearing
and for judicial review, thus undercutting the intent and frame-
work of the Act and putting both the child and the school district
at risk of untimely proceedings and wasted resource allocation. In
fact, much of the case law concerning the statute of limitations un-
• 278
der the IDEA would be redundant if tolling were appropriate.
274. Id. at 556.
275. Id.
276. More recently, the Eighth Circuit in Straum reiterated the strong federal policies in
favor of quick resolution of IDEA claims. Strawn, 210 F.3d at 959. This court also emphasized
the impact on the educational programs provided to IDEA students, noting that "children
protected by the IDEA benefit greatly from quick resolution of disputes because lost educa-
tion is a substantial harm." Id. at 957 (citation omitted).
277. See supra note 271.
278. See, e.g., In re The Educ. Assignment of M.S., Special Educ. No. 1321, at *6 n.37
(SEA Pa. Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.pattan.kl2.pa.us/ODR/RedAppDec/PDFs/
App1321 .pdf.
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V. THE 2004 IDEA AMENDMENTS
A. The 2004 IDEA Amendments Add Stage I and
Stage II Statutes of Limitation
As discussed above, the IDEA, as originally enacted, did not in-
clude explicit deadlines for filing a request for a due process
hearing or for an appeal to a court from a due process hearing.79
The 2004 amendments to the IDEA added deadlines for filing for a
due process hearing or otherwise making a complaint, as well as
appealing a hearing officer decision to court.
Due process hearings must be requested within two years:
TIMELINE FOR REQUESTING HEARING.-A parent or
agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2
years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have
known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the
complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for
requesting such a hearing under this part, in such time as the
State law allows. s0
Congress has established two exceptions for this two-year dead-
line for parents who initiate due process:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE TIMELINE.-The timeline described
in subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent
was prevented from requesting the hearing due to-
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency
that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the
complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency's withholding of information
from the parent that was required under this part to be pro-
vided to the parent.28'
279. See supra text accompanying notes 176-177.
280. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, § 615(f) (3) (C), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722.
281. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(f) (3) (D).
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The 2004 IDEA amendments also add a ninety-day deadline to
file a court appeal of a hearing officer (or, in two-tier states, a hear-
ing appeals panel) decision:
(2) RIGHT TO BRING CIVIL ACTION.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision made under subsection (f) or (k) who does not have
the right to an appeal under subsection (g), and any party ag-
grieved by the findings and decision made under this
subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with re-
spect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section,
which action may be brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without
regard to the amount in controversy.
(B) LIMITATION.-The party bringing the action shall have
90 days from the date of the decision of the hearing officer to
bring such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time limi-
tation for bringing such action under this part, in such time as
the State law allows.282
The 2004 IDEA amendments also add a two-year deadline for
making a complaint.8 3 The amendments do not explicitly address
timelines for IDEA court claims that are filed without first filing for
due process, such as attorney fee requests and claims where admin-
istrative exhaustion is not required.84 Congress thought its new
IDEA statutes of limitation important enough to add a require-
ment that schools inform parents of them in the notice of
procedural safeguards. 5
282. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(i) (2).
283. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(b)(6)(B) (using
language identical in all pertinent respects to that for initiating a due process hearing)
("[The IDEA provides] [a] n opportunity for any party to present a complaint... which sets
forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or
public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of
the complaint.... .").
284. Where the fee request follows IDEA litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
set out a fourteen-day time period for filing the request. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (2) (B). In
some instances, IDEA parents are allowed to go straight to court without first exhausting
due process, for example when they seek an injunction or a remedy that is outside of a hear-
ing officer's jurisdiction. Congress did not set out an explicit deadline for filing a lawsuit in
court without first going through due process. Congress's intent presumably would be to
impose the two-year deadline, as is explicit when IDEA action is initiated administratively.
285. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(d).
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B. Implying Tolling into a Federal Statute of Limitations
When Congress writes an explicit statute of limitations but does
not address tolling, courts may be asked to imply tolling rules. 6
The Supreme Court has explained that whether to imply a tolling
rule is a question "of legislative intent whether the right shall be
enforceable ... after the prescribed time,, 287 and "whether con-
gressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of
limitations in given circumstances."288 The indices of congressional
intent are "the purposes and policies underlying the limitation
provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for
the enforcement of the rights given by the Act."289 This is, of course,
a different congressional intent analysis than determining whether
Congress intended to borrow an analogous provision, as the Court
instructed is to be performed in situations such as that of the pre-
2004 IDEA.
Each of these relevant indices of Congressional intent indicates
tolling for minors in the post-2004 IDEA should be rejected.
1. The Purposes and Policies Underlying the IDEA's New Statute of
Limitations Provisions
a. Congress's Choice of Two-Year and Ninety-Day Deadlines-
Congress's choice of a two-year deadline for filing for due process
is significant. First and foremost, it makes clear Congress's prefer-
ence for finality and a bright line rule, as well as Congress's
rejection of alternative approaches to IDEA dispute resolution
timeliness issues. These include situations in which there is no
deadline, or only an equity-based reasonableness deadline such as
that adopted by the Third Circuit in some cases.80 Specifically,
Congress's choice to add timelines is inconsistent with tolling for
minors because, as discussed earlier in this Article, the vast majority
of IDEA claims are brought on behalf on minors.2 91 The practical
286. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (addressing whether filing a claim
in state court tolled the FELA statute of limitations).
287. Id. at 426 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 360
(1943)).
288. Id. at 427.
289. Id.
290. If Congress intended for tolling to apply, there would be little need to include a
statute of limitations. Tolling would effectively nullify any limitations period because no
IDEA cases would need to be brought until the child reaches majority.
291. See supra notes 248-249.
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impact of tolling for minors would be to make any timelines a nul-
lity.2
92
Second, Congress's adoption of explicit statutes of limitation
rather than continuing the borrowing of analogous state statutes
described above 13 suggests a desire for more uniformity.294 Third, it
is notable that Congress chose a single deadline for Stage I and
Stage II claims of all kinds,29 rather than separate deadlines for
different kinds of claims-such as tuition reimbursement and
compensatory education)-as some courts had done under the
prior borrowing analysis. Fourth, the two-year period is shorter, by
half, than the general default federal statute of limitations, 6 sug-
gesting Congress intended that IDEA disputes be initiated more
promptly than litigation under other federal statutes. Fifth, the
two-year deadline is shorter than the state statutes of limitation
some courts have borrowed for IDEA claims-a number of the
borrowed statutes were three years and some were longer.2 97 Again,
this suggests Congress intended for IDEA disputes to be initiated,
and thereby resolved, promptly. The ninety-day deadline for ap-
pealing to court also demonstrates Congressional intent that IDEA
disputes be resolved promptly, and that there will be some finality
to disputes or potential disputes between parents and schools.
Moreover, as with the two-year deadline for initiating due process,
the ninety-day court appeal deadline2" is shorter than the years-
long state statutes of limitation borrowed by some courts for IDEA
appeals.299
This choice of fairly short time periods suggests that Congress
thought that prompt resolution of IDEA disputes best served the
IDEA's primary goal of providing eligible students with appropriate
educational programs, thus impliedly rejecting suggestions by some
lower federal courts that short limitations periods force parents to
292. The situation under the IDEA if tolling were adopted would be far different than,
for example, that of torts, where prospective plaintiffs are of all ages and presumably only a
small subset are minors.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 280-283.
294. Note, however, that under the amendments, explicit state statutes of limitation will
continue to be recognized. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 615(f) (3) (C), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722.
295. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615 (f) (3) (C).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
297. See supra text accompanying note 182.
298. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615 (i) (2).
299. See supra text accompanying note 183.
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quickly become adversarial, rendering the parent role, and hence
education itself, less effective.3 0
b. Congress's Inclusion of Some Tolling Language--Congress's fairly
comprehensive treatment of time deadlines in its 2004 IDEA
amendments is also significant. In other statutes, Congress set out a
fairly bare statute of limitations, leaving much gap-filling for later
litigation. For example, the four-year default federal statute of limi-
tations is vague about when the four-year clock starts, merely
stating that claims "may not be commenced later than 4 years after
the cause of action accrues. 30 1 This "accrual" could be the date of
the harm, the date the harm is discovered, or the date the putative
plaintiff discovers she has a cause of action. In contrast, Congress
specified that the two-year clock in the 2004 IDEA amendments
begins on the "date the parent or agency knew or should have
known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the com-
plaint."
3 0 2
Similarly, the "default" federal statute of limitations includes no
tolling language. In contrast, in its 2004 IDEA amendments, Con-
gress set out two exceptions limited to parents that turn off the
two-year clock. First, if a school falsely states that a problem has
been resolved-perhaps that a physical therapist has been located
and is working with the student in accordance with the IEP-and
that misrepresentation causes the parent not to request due proc-
ess, the two-year rule does not apply.30 3 Second, when the school
has withheld information which it is required to provide to a par-
ent, presumably such as the notice of parent rights under the
IDEA, and that withholding of information causes the parent not
to request due process, the two-year rule does not apply.3 4 These
exceptions seem to be equitable tolling rules of the sort discussed
earlier in this Article.305 It thus appears Congress considered rea-
sons to suspend or turn off its two-year clock.
300. See Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1298-99, 1299 n.4 (I1th Cir.
2002) (surveying the authority taking this position and then rejecting it).
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
302. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(f) (3) (C). The pro-
posed implementing regulations do not add to this language or explicitly address the tolling
issue. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Preschool Grants
for Children with Disabilities; and Service Obligations Under Special Education-Personnel
Development to Improve Services and Results for Children With Disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg.
35782-01 (proposedJune 21, 2005).
303. See id. §615(f)(3)(D).
304. Id.
305. See supra Part II.C.
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In following the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alteris, by spe-
cifically mentioning certain conditions that would trigger tolling,
Congress must have intended to exclude tolling on other bases,
such as minority. Congress's choice not to include tolling language
based upon minority status thus appears to reflect its intent that its
two-year IDEA clock not be tolled for minors. Moreover, as the
foregoing discussion of case law addressing this tolling issue indi-
cates, borrowed state statutes of limitation typically include explicit
tolling language for minors. Congress's failure to do so is thus all
the more conspicuous.
The new tolling language appears to represent Congress's
judgment about how to balance the sometimes harsh results of
statutes of limitation such as those in the scenario with which this
Article began. Moreover, the exceptions work to ameliorate these
harsh results in some instances. For example, a student whose IEP
was not implemented, and thus did not receive FAPE, may still
have a timely claim many years later if the school misrepresented
the situation to the parents. Parent attorneys will likely argue that
the two tolling exceptions should be read broadly; in particular
that the withholding of information tolling includes items such as
the notice of procedural safeguards, the required copy of the IEP,
access to their child's records, advance notice of proposed changes
in their child's program, and reports of their child's progress.
c. Congress's Accrual Language--Congress chose explicit accrual
language pursuant to which the two-year clock starts on the date
"the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged
action that forms the basis of the complaint,"30 6 thus indicating that
it is the parent, not the minor student, who may file the claim . 7 If,
as the Shook court suggested, both IDEA minor students and their
parents had the right to file for due process,308 the accrual language
306. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(f) (3) (C) (emphasis
added).
307. Prior to the 2004 amendments, some courts and hearing officers determined that
the IDEA statute of limitation accrued when the parents knew of the alleged violation, rec-
ognizing that the parent, not the child, files the claim. See, e.g., R.R. v. Fairfax County Sch.
Bd., 338 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2003); Murphy v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 1186
(1st Cir. 1994); Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991); cf Menasha
Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR (LRP Publications) 43 (SEA Wis. 1999) (statutory prerequisite of notice
to parents). Similarly, in figuring out the length of the time period for filing IDEA claims,
courts have recognized the IDEA's policy of providing parents an opportunity to protect the
child's rights. See, e.g., Manning ex rel. Manning v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 176 F.3d 235, 239
(4th Cir. 1999).
308. Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 119, 121 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (cita-
tion omitted).
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would be expected to reference the date the student knew or
should have known of the IDEA violation.
Moreover, Congress chose accrual language which started the
clock running for parents under either of two circumstances: ac-
tual knowledge of the action about which the parent complains
and situations where a reasonable parent would have known about
the action.39 This is the language of negligence, and specifically a
duty of reasonable care. It reflects Congress's understanding that
parents of IDEA students not only have extensive rights vis-a-vis
their child's special education program, but also corresponding
responsibilities and duties including prompt initiation of the dis-
pute resolution process.
d. Legislative History for the 2004 IDEA Statutes of Limitation-
Both the House and Senate bills that were the basis of the 2004
IDEA amendments contained statutes of limitation. The IDEA bill
originally passed by the House in April 2003 contained one-year
Stage I and complaint statutes of limitation. 310 The one-year clock
began with the IDEA violation.31' The House bill did not include
any exceptions for its one-year deadline, nor a Stage II deadline.
The Senate bill was quite similar to the ultimately enacted lan-
guage. It contained a two-year Stage I statute of limitations, accrual
language substantively identical to that enacted, and a ninety-day
Stage II statute of limitations identical to that enacted . The Sen-
ate bill also included three exceptions to its two-year Stage I clock
that are substantially similar to the two exceptions enacted. 3
The legislative history for the 2004 IDEA amendments reflects
Congress's intent to have IDEA disputes resolved quickly, as well as
the educational and other benefits it foresaw from prompt dispute
resolution. The House Report notes that the statute of limitations
and other modifications to the IDEA dispute resolution process
will restore trust and reduce litigation, help ensure that eligible
students obtain the needed services and education in a timely
manner, and improve the current state of litigation under the Act,
which has taken the less productive track of searching for technical
violations of the Act by school districts rather than being used to
309. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615(f)(3)(C).
310. H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. §§ 205(b) (6) (B), (0(1) (A) (2003).
311. Id.
312. S. 1248,108th Cong. §§ 615(f)(3)(D)(E), (h)(2)(B) (2004).
313. Id. § 615(f)(3)(E).
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protect the substantive rights of children with disabilities. 4 Conse-
quently, "trust between schools and parents" will be restored."5
In its fullest statement concerning the proposed one-year statute
of limitations, the House Report notes:
The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves local
educational agencies open to litigation for the entire length
of time a child is in school, whether or not the child has been
identified as a child with a disability. Local educational agen-
cies are often surprised by claims from parents involving
issues that occurred in an elementary school program when
the child may currently be a high school student. Such an un-
reasonably long threat of litigation hanging over a local
educational agency forces them to document every step they
take with every child, even if the parents agree with the ac-
tion, because they could later change their mind and sue. The
fear of far-removed litigation raises the tension level between
the school and the parent. Prolonged litigation breeds an atti-
tude of distrust between the parents and school personnel
and has the effect of requiring school personnel to document
conversations, rather than working cooperatively to find the
best education placement and services for the child.
The bill includes a statute of limitations of one year from the
date of the violation. This change will align the Act with other
Federal statutes that have explicit statutes of limitations (e.g.,
civil rights claims, Federal tort claims, Social Security) and al-
low for timely resolution of issues. Parents, or their advocates,
often wait to bring actions until many years after discovering a
concern. The child's education is usually jeopardized by this
strategy. A statue [sic] of limitations alleviates ... unnecessary
314. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 85-86 (2003).
315. Id. at 130. The minority views contained in the House Report include:
[There is a] need that schools have for some type of closure regarding their possible
liability, [however] one year is much too short. It is not unusual for parents to take a
full year to realize the nature of their child's disability and to come to a full under-
standing of that child's needs. Parents should have at least three years in which to
begin the complaint process ....
Id. at 379.
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paperwork designed to protect them from protracted, long-
.• • 311
term litigation.
Tolling the new IDEA statute of limitations for minors would of
course lead to exactly the same consequences that the House Re-
port indicates Congress wished to avoid: "local educational
agencies open to litigation for the entire length of time a child is in
school," with this "unreasonably long threat of litigation hanging
over" the school "breed[ing] an attitude of distrust ... [with] the
effect of requiring school personnel to document conversations,
rather than working cooperatively to find the best education
placement and services for the child.
3 17
316. Id. at 115-16.
317. Id. The Senate Report also includes a detailed statement concerning its statute of
limitations:
Section 615(f) (3) (D) creates a new two year timeline for requesting a hearing on
claims for reimbursed or ongoing compensatory education services. If the State has
developed an explicit timeline for requesting a due process hearing either through
statute or regulation, that State provision will apply. The bill also provides for excep-
tions to the timeline in limited instances. The committee does not intend that
common law determinations of statutes of limitation override this specific directive or
the specific State or regulatory timeline.
This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under IDEA that children
may receive compensatory education services, as affirmed in School Comm. of Burling-
ton v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) and Florence County
School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and otherwise limited under section
612(a) (10) (C). First, the statute of limitations will bar consideration of claims where:
(1) the allegation relates to conduct or services that are more than two years prior to
the commencement of due process on the basis of that conduct or those services, or
upon the unilateral placement of the child in a private school or with a private ser-
vice provider, and (2) during that two year period, either (a) the services are not
alleged to have been at cost or inappropriate, or (b) the conduct is not alleged to
have been appropriate. In essence, where the issue giving rise to the claim is more
than two years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or ser-
vices at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory
education services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services
and the conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due
process or the private placement. Second, the statute of limitations will bar consid-
eration of claims for reimbursement of private school tuition or services where the
child has not attended school with the public entity for more than two years. Simply
put, if a child leaves a public school and the parent chooses to place the child in a
private school, the parent must claim through due process that they are entitled to
reimbursement for those services prior to the two year anniversary of that student's
departure.
S. REp. No. 108-185, at 40 (2003).
This statement clarifies that the new timeline applies to tuition reimbursement claims
and that the prior judicial borrowings of analogous statutes of limitation are not the type of
state timelines that override the new IDEA statutes of limitations. See supra Part IV.
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2. The Nature of the IDEA-The IDEA's structure, its unique par-
ent role, its policy of prompt dispute resolution, and the
educational effectiveness reasons for that structure, parent role,
and dispute resolution policy all strongly favor rejecting implied
tolling for minors under the 2004 IDEA statutes of limitation, just
as they strongly favored rejecting the borrowing of tolling provi-
sions under the pre-2004 IDEA.
The 2004 amendments made these identified structure and
goals even clearer. As described above,1 s the 2004 amendments
worked to strengthen the role of parents in the IDEA process, even
to the point where schools must defer to certain, possibly ill-
advised, parent choices about their child's special education. En-
acting guidance from the Department of Education, and
overriding at least one court decision,3 9 the 2004 amendments
provide that if a parent refuses to give the necessary consent for
initial placement in special education, the school may not initiate
due process to attempt to override the lack of parental consent and
320get a hearing officer to order placement in special education.
While there may be disagreement about the wisdom of this ap-
proach, 21 Congress has made it clear that a parent's wish to keep
her child in general education overrides a school's reasonable be-
lief that the student needs special education, and thereby the
child's receipt of an appropriate education. If tolling for minors
were allowed under the IDEA, a suit by an adult IDEA student that
sought many years of compensatory education as a remedy because
she was kept out of special education due to her parents refusing
consent would not be time-barred. Surely Congress did not intend
such a result.3 22 This new provision and others323 also make it clear
318. See supra Part III.B.2.i.
319. Garcia v. Town of Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., EHLR (LRP Publications) 558:152 (D.
Conn. 1986) (finding that if a school believes a student requires special education, and a
parent refuses the necessary written consent, the school must initiate due process to attempt
to override the parent's refusal).
320. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, § 614(A)(1)(D), 118 Stat. 2647, 2702-03.
321. See discussion supra note 103.
322. As another example, tuition reimbursement represents a significant segment of
special education litigation at both the hearing/review officer and court stages. See, e.g.,
Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 267, at 355. These claims clearly are made by parents for reim-
bursement of expenses incurred in trying to ensure their child received FAPE when the
public schools were not providing it. If tolling for minors applied, query whether the par-
ents' claim would be tolled, when it is the parents who made the unilateral placement and
who would receive reimbursement.
323. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 612(a) (25) (A)
(stating that schools cannot condition school attendance, evaluation, or provision of services
on a student getting, and presumably taking, certain prescription medications).
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that Congress recognized that on occasion an eligible student
would not receive FAPE, and thus make it more likely that Con-
gress was comfortable with the harsh result of some instances of
failing to toll: that some meritorious IDEA claims would be time-
barred.
Moreover, the 2004 amendments changed the Congressional
findings about educational effectiveness and parent involvement
that underlie the IDEA in a noteworthy way. Prior to the 2004
amendments, these findings referred to the following:
(5) Over 20 years of research and experience has demon-
strated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by-
... (B) strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at
home .... 324
The 2004 amendments modify this finding as follows:
(5) Almost 30 years of research and experience has demon-
strated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by-
... (B) strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and
ensuring that families of such children have meaningful op-
portunities to participate in the education of their children at
325
school and at home ....
Congress explicitly found that responsibilities come with the
rights it accords parents for the utilitarian reasons described above.
Those responsibilities include initiating the IDEA dispute resolu-
tion procedures when they believe their child is not receiving an
appropriate education.
3. The IDEA's Remedial Scheme-Analysis of the impact on the
unique IDEA scheme for resolving disputes if tolling for minors
were adopted strongly suggests such tolling is inconsistent with
Congressional intent.
324. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(5) (2000).
325. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 60 (b) (5) (B) (emphasis
added).
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a. Compensatory Education Claims by Adult IDEA Students Based on
Alleged Violations Dating Back Many Years-The common scenario in
the IDEA tolling cases discussed above3 26 is an adult IDEA student
or former student seeking compensatory education for alleged
IDEA violations dating back many years. No doubt in some in-
stances involving such a scenario, the school has violated its IDEA
obligations, perhaps egregiously. In some other cases, these adult
students, facing the end of special education eligibility, may feel
unable to succeed without continued support and may be realizing
that the level of support for disabled adults is not nearly at the level
of services under the IDEA for students with disabilities. For exam-
ple, a medically fragile student who receives extensive nursing and
physical therapy related services, an emotionally disturbed student
who is placed residentially or in a day treatment program, or a se-
verely retarded student who receives job coaching and other
vocational training, all pursuant to IEPs, may find difficulty receiv-
ing the same level of government assistance as an adult. A
successful claim for compensatory education offers these students
additional years of high-level government support. IDEA tolling for
minors would mean claims by these students would not be time-
barred.
b. Impact of the "Stay Put" Provision-The IDEA's "stay put" provi-
sion requires in general that when IDEA due process is initiated,
the school must keep the student in her last uncontested place-
ment while the due process hearing and any appeals are
327pending. Courts have recognized that the "stay put" provision is
relevant to IDEA statutes of limitation analysis.3 2 Graduation and
withdrawals from school are changes in placement.3 9 Hence, if an
about-to-graduate adult IDEA student files for due process, seeking
compensatory education for alleged IDEA violations dating back
many years, the "stay put" provision arguably requires that the
school keep the student in special education until the due process
hearing and any appeals are over. On occasion, courts have also
issued injunctions ordering schools to provide compensatory
326. See supra Parts IV.C.3.a-b.
327. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2000).
328. See, e.g., Ga. State Dep't of Educ. v. Derrick C., 314 F.3d 545, 550-51 (l1th Cir.
2002) (stating that the purpose of the IDEA stay put provision suggests a short timeline is
consistent with a short limitations period).
329. Cf Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 614(c)(5)(B) (ex-
cluding graduation and aging-out as changes that require reevaluation).
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education while a claim by an adult (former) student is pending.3 0
IDEA litigation can span many years. If the school ultimately pre-
vails, there is no realistic prospect for reimbursement of education
services it has provided during the stay put or injunction period. If
the IDEA includes tolling for minors, the school faced with such a
claim cannot attempt to get the case quickly dismissed as time-
barred and likely will have to defend the claim on the merits. This
means the school will have to provide educational services-for
which the student ultimately may be found ineligible-for a
lengthy "stay put" or injunctive period.
c. IDEA Records Requirements and the Defense of IDEA Claims-A
primary reason for statutes of limitation is to prevent the trying of
stale claims, where lost or destroyed evidence as well as faded wit-
ness memories may make the litigation difficult for both plaintiffs
(who may have difficulty meeting their burden of proof) and de-
fendants (whose access to evidence to defend themselves may be
limited). In IDEA hearings and litigation, the student's educational
records are a major source of evidence. The IDEA itself contains
no requirement that special education records be retained for a
specific period. However, general requirements for federally
funded education programs (such as IDEA) require that records
sufficient to document compliance with federal funding conditions
be maintained for three years after the completion of the federally
funded activity. Thus, for example, IEPs and evaluations would
need to be maintained for at least three years to document com-
pliance with IDEA. State public records retention laws may also
specify a retention period for education records.3
What the IDEA does require is that when a student's special
education records are "no longer needed to provide educational
services to the child" (often because that student is graduating,
withdrawing from school, or being decertified from special educa-
tion), the school must notify the parents (or adult student) and
inform them of their right to request destruction of their special
education records. Schools are encouraged to inform parents
330. See, e.g., K.R v. Juzwic, 891 F. Supp. 703 (D. Conn. 1995) (affirming a grant of pre-
liminary injunction keeping a twenty-one year-old student in his educational placement
pending resolution of his claim for compensatory education for alleged IDEA violations
when he was aged eight to nineteen).
331. 20 U.S.C. § 1232f (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 76.730-.731 (2004).
332. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-109 (1999); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-4-10 (2005).
333. 34 C.F.R. § 300.573(a); see also Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking up Buckley I: Making the
Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 646 (1997); Dixie Snow Huefner
& Lynn M. Daggett, ThERPA Update: Balancing Access to and Privacy of Student Records, 152
EDuc. L. REp. 469,487 (2001).
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that retaining special education records may be helpful for other
purposes such as social security benefits. However, if the parents so
request, the no-longer-necessary records must be destroyed,3' ex-
cept that the school may permanently maintain a record of the
student's name, address, telephone number, grades, attendance
record, classes attended, grade level completed, and year com-
pleted. 335 Hence in a scenario like that in Jonathan T, the school
would inform the adult student who is withdrawing from school of
his right to request destruction of records. If IDEA claims were
tolled for minors, schools like the one in Jonathan T could be faced
with a timely claim for compensatory education by an adult student
such as Jonathan T. and not have the records in its possession to
defend itself, because that adult student had exercised his right to
have the records destroyed.
In sum, although Congress did not explicitly address the issue of
tolling IDEA claims for minors in the 2004 amendments, Con-
gress's intent on the issue is clear. Considering the adopted statute
of limitations and tolling language, the IDEA's structure and its
unique and even more enhanced parent role that now explicitly
includes responsibilities as well as rights, and the harsh and even
nonsensical consequences of such tolling under the IDEA's unique
remedial scheme, it is clear that tolling IDEA claims for minors
would be both inappropriate and contrary to congressional intent.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that Congress ever intended that the IDEA statutes
of limitation be tolled for minors. To do so would effectively nullify
any statute of limitations, since the vast majority of alleged IDEA
violations occur when covered students are minors. Moreover, toll-
ing for minors would be inconsistent with Congress's explicit
assignment of the right to file claims to parents, the unique proxy
and partner role it has created for IDEA parents, the educational
effectiveness goal the unique parent role is designed to serve, and
Congress's intent that IDEA disputes be resolved promptly.
The 2004 IDEA amendments confirm and clarify Congress's in-
tent not to toll IDEA claims for minors. In the amendments,
Congress added fairly short statutes of limitations and some limited
334. 34 C.F.R. § 300.560 (2004).
335. 34 C.F.R. § 300.573 (2004).
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tolling provisions. Congress conspicuously did not add a tolling
provision for minors. The legislative history for the 2004 statutes of
limitation reemphasizes Congress's intent that IDEA disputes be
resolved quickly. The legislative history and provisions added by
the recent amendments also indicate Congress's wish to avoid the
exact consequences which would result from tolling for minors:
the possibility of a school having to face the kinds of claims exem-
plified in the scenario set out at the beginning of this Article.
Despite the decisions of several courts to the contrary, it should
now be clear that IDEA claims should not be tolled on account of
minority.
